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PREFACE 
The research for this paper was undertaken by EPRC in preparation for the 28th IQ-Net 
meeting to be held in Brussels, Belgium, on 6-7 May 2010. The paper has been written by 
John Bachtler and Carlos Mendez. It should be noted that the paper was revised following 
the IQ-Net meeting on 6-7 May to take account of the discussions and conclusions drawn at 
the meeting. 
This paper is the product of desk research and fieldwork visits during Spring 2010. 
Fieldwork research has entailed an extensive programme with IQ-Net managing authorities 
and implementing bodies. The research on individual countries was undertaken as follows: 
x Stefan Kah (Austria, Slovenia) x Dr Sara Davies (Germany) 
x Prof. Douglas Yuill (Belgium)  x Dr Csaba Novák, Gabriella Borbás and Éva 
Koti (Hungary) 
x Dr Lucie Jungwiertová, Dr Marie 
Maceková (Czech Republic) 
x Laura Polverari (Italy) 
x Prof. Henrik Halkier (Denmark) x Dr Martin Ferry (Poland) 
x Dr Kaisa Lähteenmäki-Smith (Finland) x Carlos Mendez (Portugal, Spain) 
x Frederike Gross (France) x Dr Katja Mirwaldt (Sweden) 
x Victoria Chorafa, Dimitris Lianos (Greece) x Rona Michie, Dr Martin Ferry, Prof. John 
Bachtler (United Kingdom) 
EPRC thanks all those who participated in the research. EPRC also gratefully acknowledges 
the financial support provided by participating Member States and regions, whose 
contributions are co-financed by technical assistance from the European Structural Funds. 
The report is, however, the responsibility of the authors alone. The partners in the IQ-Net 
network are as follows: 
Austria 
x State Government of Niederösterreich, Economic and Tourism Department 
x State Government of Steiermark, Economic Policy Department 
Belgium 
x Enterprise Flanders 
Czech Republic  
x Ministry for Regional Development 
Denmark 
x Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority 
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Finland 
x Alliance of Länsi-Suomi 
x Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à laménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité 
régionale (DATAR) 
Germany 
x Nordrhein-Westfalen, Ministry of Economy, SMEs and Energy, EU Affairs Unit 
x Sachsen-Anhalt, Ministry of Finance 
Greece 
x Management Organisation Unit of Development Programmes S.A. 
Hungary 
x Hungarian Enterprise Development Centre (MAG), in association with the 
National Development Agency (NDA) 
Italy 
x Lombardia Region, DG Industry, SMEs, Cooperation and Tourism 
x Ministry of Economic Development 
x Institute for Industrial Promotion (IPI) 
Poland 
x ĦlĎskie Voivodeship (Marshals Office) 
Portugal 
x Financial Institute for Regional Development (IFDR) 
Spain 
x País Vasco, Provincial Council of Bizkaia, Department of Economy and Finance 
Slovenia 
x Government Office for Local Self-Government and Regional Policy, 
EU Cohesion Policy Department 
Sweden 
x Tillväxtverket, Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth 
United Kingdom 
x Department of Communities and Local Government 
x ONE NorthEast 
x Scottish Government 
x Welsh European Funding Office 
 
For further information about IQ-Net, and access to the full series of IQ-Net Papers, please 
visit the IQ-Net website at: www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/default.cfm
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the IQ-Net Consortium. 
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THE REFORM OF COHESION POLICY AFTER 2013:   
MORE CONCENTRATION, GREATER PERFORMANCE AND BETTER 
GOVERNANCE?  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
After two years of EU consultation and reflection, the debate on the reform of Cohesion 
policy has intensified. Several major contributions have appeared over the past year, 
including the Barca Report, a reflections paper by former Commissioner Hübner a similar 
orientation paper by her successor Commissioner Pawel Samecki, and the conclusions of 
recent EU Council Presidencies. The key reform ideas and proposals contained in these 
documents are to: strengthen concentration on EU objectives; require a better 
performance and a results-orientation; review the alignment of funding instruments; 
achieve more strategic coherence between relevant policy areas; strengthen territorial 
cooperation; simplify administrative procedures; and to increase the strategic role of the 
Commission in the governance of policy. 
There is broad agreement on the need for greater concentration among IQ-Net managing 
authorities. While greater alignment with the Europe 2020 strategy is welcomed, they are 
critical of the lack of reference to cohesion issues and are greatly concerned at the 
consequences of an overly thematic approach (as opposed to a place-based approach). 
There is support for the proposed priorities of innovation and competitiveness, social 
inclusion and green growth, but an insistence on sufficient flexibility for strategies to be 
adapted to national and regional needs and institutional arrangements.  
On the question of coherence between policy areas and funding instruments, managing 
authorities are supportive of proposals of a common strategic framework for cohesion at 
EU level but only if it simplifies the hierarchy of objectives rather than adding another 
layer. However, there is widespread doubt as to whether such an umbrella strategy is 
achievable in practice. The interface between Structural Funds and Rural Development is a 
seen as a particular priority for improved coherence. 
The importance of territoriality is reinforced in the discussion about territorial cooperation 
and territorial cohesion. Managing authorities see considerable merit in a more integrated 
policy response to the distinctive needs and challenges of particular territories, but there is 
a strong insistence on Member States and regions determining the appropriate spatial scale 
of intervention. They are also supportive of territorial cooperation, but its value is seen as 
being greater in theory than in practical results on the ground.  
While accepting the arguments for a more performance and results-oriented policy, 
managing authorities are largely sceptical about the use of EU-determined conditionalities 
with sanctions. Instead, authorities see more scope in exploring how individual 
countries/regions could be incentivised to improve performance in programme-specific 
ways, and to use more qualitative methods for assessing performance through peer review, 
benchmarking, exchanges of best practice and evaluation. A major obstacle is that 
monitoring continues to be problematic for many managing authorities, with unrealistic 
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targets, variable data quality, data processing issues and limited exploitation of results. It 
is in the area of evaluation that investment appears to have been more productive. The 
main message is that requirements should not be imposed uniformly, but that the approach 
should remain needs-based and flexible.  
Strategic reporting is regarded as a positive step to enhance accountability and debate 
about performance but it suffers from some of the deficiencies of monitoring and 
evaluation, notably the compliance-oriented response from several Member States and the 
lack of comparability between national reports.  
There is universal agreement on the need to simplify implementation rules and procedures 
but no clear consensus on how it should be achieved. Differentiation of requirements by 
Member State has some support among managing authorities, but others are opposed to 
moving away from uniformly applied rules.  There are also differences over whether 
decommitment should apply at the national level, and over the suggestion that EU 
reimbursement could be based on a declaration of payments by Member States, rather than 
on expenditure. There is broader agreement on extending the use of system assurance 
(underlying the current single audit model) whereby the focus of Commission assessment is 
on national or programme systems, while relying on Member States to ensure that the 
systems are applied properly in practice. The introduction of some form of proportionality 
of administrative requirements for different types of intervention is generally favoured by 
managing authorities. The need for clear rules is also stressed and there is widespread 
support for the harmonisation of eligibility rules across EU funding instruments. 
Resolving the administrative burden of financial management, control and audit is seen as 
the key issue for improving the general governance of Cohesion policy and for allowing the 
Commission to strengthen its strategic role. In this context, managing authorities would 
welcome the development of capacity within the Commission services on strategic policy 
issues, an enhanced Commission role in facilitating the transfer of best practice and its 
application in individual countries/regions, and a better relationship between Commission 
geographical units and programme managers. Within Member States, managing authorities 
are generally content with the current partnership arrangements. The main challenge is one 
for Member States in building the capacity among non-state actors to become more credible 
and active partners in programme management and implementation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After two years of EU consultation and reflection, the debate on the reform of Cohesion 
policy is intensifying. Several major contributions to the debate have appeared over the 
past year, which give some indication of how thinking is evolving.  
The Barca Report was published in April 2009, putting forward a concept for Structural 
Funds as a place-based policy that provides a long-term strategy for tackling persistent 
underutilisation of potential and reducing persistent social exclusion in specific places 
through external intervention and multi-level governance. Drawing on the ideas in the 
Barca Report, Commissioner Danuta Hübner presented a reflections paper to the Informal 
Meeting of Regional Ministers organised under the Czech Presidency, and at the end of 
2009, a similar orientation paper was published by Commissioner Pawel Samecki. Both of 
these papers advocated a strong development policy which enables all EU citizens, 
wherever they live, to reap the benefits and to mitigate the risks of market unification.  
The future development of Cohesion policy is, however, strongly contested  within the 
Commission and beyond  and has been subject to strident criticism principally on the 
grounds of performance and governance. Reflecting these criticisms, a quite different 
proposal for Cohesion policy is contained in the Commission non-paper on the budget 
review, which appeared in November 2009. This conceived of Cohesion policy as having a 
more secondary role to other EU policies, with a principal focus on national convergence, 
and addressing major regional disparities within (some) countries.  
The substance of the policy is also being debated in the light of the widening of the EUs 
cohesion objectives to include territorial cohesion. This has involved successive 
consultations and discussions in different fora, most recently in the background paper 
prepared by DG Regio for the Kiruna conference in late 2009 and the 2nd TCUM Seminar in 
March 2010. The focus has been on ways in which the new objective might be interpreted 
through cooperation between territories, strengthening territorial programming in cohesion 
policy, coordination for greater policy coherence, and territorial analysis. 
Although most Member States have yet to take official positions on the reform of Cohesion 
policy, they have been engaged in the debate, partly through informal ministerial meetings 
- on the architecture and governance of the policy (Czech and Spanish Presidencies) and 
territorial cohesion (French and Swedish Presidencies). At the most recent informal meeting 
in Zaragoza, the discussions centred on the objectives and priorities for the future as well 
as the issue of management simplification. The High-Level Group convened in mid-2009 by 
DG Regio has brought together senior national officials for a series of meetings to consider 
several important technical aspects of policy reform. Similar processes of review and the 
development of reform proposals are underway in DG Emploi and DG Agri. 
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Looking to the future, the timetable for Cohesion policy reform involves the adoption of the 
Fifth Cohesion Report in early November 2010, a Cohesion Forum in early 2011 and the 
publication of a proposed Financial Perspective and subsequent legislative package for 
Cohesion policy in Spring/Summer 2011. 
While the reform debate has involved many different contributions, with some divergent 
ideas on the role and spatial coverage of Cohesion policy, there are common issues 
concerning the priorities, governance and implementation of the policy. These include: 
x focusing the policy on a limited number of EU objectives, notably research and 
innovation, low-carbon economy, human capital; 
x requiring better and more visible performance and a results-orientation through 
conditionalities on spending, better indicators, strategic reporting and evaluation; 
x a different alignment of funding instruments; 
x achieving more strategic coherence between relevant policy areas through (for 
example) joint strategic planning or programming of all EU funding; 
x strengthening territorial cooperation, including the use of functional macro-regions 
as a basis for planning/intervention; and 
x reviewing administrative procedures, with potential differentiation of management 
and control requirements and other simplification measures. 
Against this background, this IQ-Net paper aims to assess how these proposals are viewed by 
managing authorities and others involved in implementing Structural Funds on the ground. 
It examines whether the proposed changes are regarded as beneficial in principle, the 
implications of operationalising them, where they might encounter problems, and what 
alternatives could be considered, taking account of domestic practice in some cases.  
The paper is based on desk research and an extensive set of fieldwork interviews conducted 
in March-April 2010 with national and regional managing authorities in 16 Member States - 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. While 
not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of the views of the other countries (and not 
representing their official views), the IQ-Net managing authorities interviewed are wholly 
or partly responsible for managing or implementing 127 billion, some 36 percent of 
Structural Funds in the EU27. The paper also takes account of the discussions at the IQ-Net 
meeting held in Brussels on 6-7 May 2010. 
The paper is structured as follows. It begins in Section 2 with a discussion of the future 
priorities for Cohesion policy, in particular reactions to the Europe 2020 strategy and 
proposals for greater thematic concentration. The ambition of making the policy more 
performance-based and results-oriented is the subject of Section 3, which considers the use 
of conditionalities and incentives, monitoring and evaluation, the role of strategic reporting 
and institutional capacity. Section 4 considers the prospects for more strategic coherence 
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between policies and funding instruments, and Section 5 focuses on the proposed 
development of territorial cooperation and cohesion. Detailed proposals for simplifying the 
management of Cohesion policy are discussed in Section 6, and changes to governance 
(notably the role of the Commission and partnership) are the subject of Section 7. The final 
section of the paper contains preliminary conclusions and questions as a starting point for 
debate at the IQ-Net meeting (Section 8). 
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2. PRIORITIES FOR COHESION POLICY 
At the heart of the debate on the future of Cohesion policy is concentration - an increasing 
recognition of the need to focus the policy on a limited number of priorities. The Barca 
Report argues that this would allow a Europe-wide critical mass of interventions to be 
achieved, with greater potential impact, and which would receive more political attention 
and allow more focused management by policymakers, especially in the Commission.1 
Three criteria for the selection of these priorities are identified by Barca:  
x EU-wide relevance: the needs and expectations of European citizens and of the 
advantage of the EU over Member States in addressing the issue;   
x their place-based nature: the extent to which the inefficiency and/or social 
exclusion problems relevant for the issue are context dependent, requiring 
interventions to be  tailored to the characteristics and needs of different places; 
and 
x verifiability: the extent to which policy objectives can be clearly identified and 
measured  
The Barca Report proposes that funding should focus on no more than 3-4 priorities and 
puts forward six potential candidates: innovation; adapting to climate change; migration; 
children; skills; and ageing. The Samecki orientations paper concurs on the need for, and 
benefits of, greater concentration, but it proposes a slightly different categorisation of 
priorities:2
x Strengthening the knowledge base for growth: investments in research, 
technological development, innovation, knowledge and skills development, 
improvements in access to finance, fostering knowledge spillovers and facilitating 
better linkages and interactions between technologically leading and lagging 
regions. 
x Enhancing conditions for a connective and green economy: adapting to a low-
carbon economy and enhancing environmental quality, supporting sustainable 
transport and ICT infrastructure, ensuring greater connectivity of lagging to leading 
areas and improving environmental infrastructure.  
x Promoting employment and social cohesion: increasing employment, finding new 
ways to tackle rising unemployment, promoting self-employment, acquisition of 
new skills, social inclusion and the economic and social integration of migrants and 
vulnerable populations.  
                                                 
1 Barca, F. (2009) An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A place-based approach to meeting 
European Union challenges and expectations, DG Regio, European Commission, Brussels. 
 
2 Samecki, P. (2009a) Orient at ion Paper on Fut ure Cohesion Pol icy, DG Regio, European Commission, 
Brussels. 
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In the meantime, the Commission has issued the Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth 
for consultation (in November 2009) to replace the Lisbon agenda and provide a strategic 
reference for future EU policy priorities.3  
2.1 Europe 2020 Priorities 
The Commissions proposals for Europe 2020 outline three main thematic priorities and 
several sub-priorities, subsequently linked to possible EU flagship policies (Table 1).  
National objectives would be set by the Member States over a five-year time frame, while 
the European Council and the Commission would monitor progress in achieving them. At the 
end of March 2010, the Council approved three quantitative targets for increasing 
employment levels, boosting spending on research and development and meeting the EUs 
environmental commitments. Approval of the two other targets proposed by the 
Commission  increasing education levels and social inclusion  is expected at the summit of 
June 2010. Importantly, the Council has accepted that the EU-wide targets should be 
broken down into differentiated national targets, which was not the case under the Lisbon 
Strategy. 
Table 1: Europe 2020 priorities 
Priority Sub-priorities Possible EU flagship plans 
Innovation  EU Innovation Plan 
Education  Youth on the Move 
Growth based on knowledge and 
innovation 
Digital society EU Digital Agenda 
Employment  A New Jobs Agenda 
Skills  New Skills for New Jobs 
An inclusive high-employment 
society 
Fighting poverty European Action against Poverty 
Combating climate change 
Low-Carbon Strategy 
 
Clean and efficient energy 
Energy Action Plan 
 
Green growth: a competitive 
and sustainable economy 
Competitiveness 
Industrial Policy for the 
Globalisation Era 
Source: Adapted from Barroso Presentation to the Informal European Council, 11 February 2010. 
EU Cohesion policy has not featured prominently in the Commissions Europe 2020 vision, 
partly reflecting the general nature of the consultation document. In a recent European 
Council Meeting, the only (indirect) reference made to Cohesion policy by President Barroso 
was as part of the development of an Industrial Policy for a Globalised Era which would 
combine the efforts of all EU policy instruments of relevance (e.g. internal market, 
competition, skills, regional policy, trade and investment, standards and regulatory 
                                                 
3 European Commission (2009) Commission Working Document  Consult at ion on t he Fut ure "EU 2020" 
St rat egy, COM(2009)647 final, 24.11.2009, Brussels.   
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convergence).4 From a governance perspective, the need to enhance “ t he cont ribut ion of  
st akeholders at  nat ional  and regional level  and of  t he social  part ners”  was also noted,  
although Cohesion policys multi-level governance delivery system was not specifically 
mentioned.  
An alternative view on the contribution of EU Cohesion policy to the Europe 2020 Strategy 
has been provided in a recent DG Regio presentation which (re)formulated the priorities for 
the future Cohesion policy  in line with the above-mentioned Samecki proposals - as 
follows: 
x creating growth through knowledge: investments in the building blocks of 
innovation, human capital and R&D infrastructure;  
x empowering people in inclusive societies: investments that target both individuals 
and the barriers they encounter to employment and integration; and a strong focus 
on urban and local development; 
x creating a competitive, connected and greener economy: high speed internet, 
the development of smart transport and energy infrastructures, measures to foster 
energy efficiency; and facilitating adjustment to the low carbon economy. 
Further Commission thinking is anticipated during 2010 with the forthcoming publication of 
two Communications that will examine how to reinforce the contribution of Cohesion Policy 
to Europe 2020, covering the respective themes of sustainable development, and the 
knowledge-based economy and regional innovation.5  
At the Member State level, there is broad support among national governments for aligning 
EU Cohesion policy - and other EU policies - with the Europe 2020 strategy.6  This was also 
one of the central messages from regional and local authorities (and other environmental 
bodies) in their responses to the consultation, along with calls for a stronger decision-
making role in Cohesion policy and the broader Europe 2020 strategy. In a recent opinion, 
the Committee of the Regions went further by underlining “ t he importance of  a wel l -
f inanced, EU-wide Cohesion pol icy involving al l  regions of  Europe, as a key factor in 
support ing del ivery of  t he new St rat egy.” 7 It also asserted that the new strategy should use 
Cohesion policys “ exist ing part nership st ruct ures t o address t he current  weaknesses in t he 
                                                 
4 Barroso J M (2010) EUROPE 2020: A st rat egy for sust ainable growt h and j obs, Contribution from the 
President of the European Commission to the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government of 
11 February 2010, Brussels. 
 
5 European Commission (2010) Commission Work Programme 2010, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 135 final, Brussels. 
 
6 European Commission (2010) Europe 2020 – publ ic consult at ion - f irst  overview of  responses, 
Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2010)116 final, Brussels:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/eu2020_public_consultation_preliminary_overview_of_responses.pd
f    
 
7 Committee of the Regions (2009) Opinion of  t he CoR on t he fut ure of  t he Lisbon St rat egy post  2010, 
CdR, 25/2009. 
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[Lisbon agenda] governance st ruct ures. An expl icit  al ignment  of  governance st ruct ures 
wit h t he Regional Programmes in t he EU Cohesion Pol icy, provides a far more ef fect ive 
way of  ensuring j oined up pol icy making.”  Notwithstanding this support for alignment of 
objectives, the new president of the Committee of the Regions recently warned against 
turning Cohesion policy into a mere tool for implementing the Europe 2020 strategy and 
called for the policy to remain firmly anchored in its Treaty objectives8. This meshes with 
ongoing criticism by the Committee about an excessive focus on Lisbon in the current 
programme period.  
2.2 Managing Authorities’ assessment of Europe 2020 
The views of IQ-Net managing authorities reinforce the ambivalence of EU regional 
policymakers towards Europe 2020. At the level of general principles, there is broad 
agreement among managing authorities with the thrust of the proposed Europe 2020 
priorities and for EU Cohesion policy to be more closely aligned with the strategy. Many 
managing authorities consider that the priorities represent continuity with respect to the 
current Lisbon agenda. The Europe 2020 priorities are defined broadly, potentially allowing 
the diverse development needs and challenges of 27 Member States to be accommodated, 
and the question is how they would be translated into a guidance framework, national 
benchmarks and monitoring procedures for designing and implementing Cohesion policy 
programmes.  
However, the value of Europe 2020 as a framework for Cohesion policy is subject to several 
inter-related criticisms:  
x the strategy lacks a territorial dimension and does not recognise the central place 
of Cohesion policy in addressing this dimension;  
x the strategy is excessively focused on leading-edge EU sectors or areas to promote 
overall EU growth rather than supporting the whole productive basis of the EU 
territory in a balanced manner (while ensuring that lagging regions remain the 
primary target of support);  
x the generic nature of the strategy does not provide a strong rationale for a 
regional or place-based policy  and some would argue that almost any activity 
could be justified by referring to one of the priorities, unless a stronger positive 
lead is provided for policymakers at national and regional levels; 
x this thematic approach could have damaging consequences for the sustainability of 
Cohesion policy because it may lead to more priority being placed on other EU 
sectoral policies; and 
x the long-term mission of Cohesion policy is in danger of being undermined, with 
disruption to region-specific development strategies for which the Europe 2020 
                                                 
8 Committee of the Regions (2010) Cohesion pol icy should be driven by t he EU Treat y, rat her t han by 
EU 2020 agenda, Press Release, CoR/10/018, 19 February 2010, Brussels/Zaragoza. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 26(2)  European Policies Research Centre 8
The Reform of Cohesion Policy After 2013: More Concentration, Greater Performance and Better 
Governance? 
priorities are seen as less relevant (in particular because they are already being 
addressed by sectoral policies).  
Among the specific priorities, innovation and competitiveness has widespread support 
amongst managing authorities. Some emphasised that this should be the primary priority for 
Cohesion policy, in line with the current strategies of Regional Competitiveness & 
Employment programmes. An increasing focus on research and innovation is also evident in 
countries with major allocations under the Convergence objective. However, several 
managing authorities would resist restrictions on spending in areas such as local and 
regional infrastructure, given the importance of such basic interventions for current 
growth strategies, not just in Convergence regions but also in more developed areas facing 
ongoing economic adjustment challenges. 
The second Europe 2020 priority  empowering people in inclusive societies  focuses 
heavily on employment and equality of opportunity, regarded as crucial for achieving social 
cohesion, particularly in the current crisis context. However, there is no unanimity on the 
relative importance to be given to the social dimension: some managing authorities would 
like social issues and the role of ESF to be strengthened as part of regional strategies, while 
others consider the social dimension as being more relevant to national ESF interventions. 
Similarly, while some authorities would welcome a more explicit focus on areas such as 
education and health care services, others question the role of Structural Funds in 
supporting certain public services, particularly social housing. Thus, the overriding message 
from the research is the need for flexibility in the economic/social balance of interventions 
 and the concomitant balance between ERDF and ESF spending  to allow strategies to be 
adapted to national and regional needs and institutional arrangements (see also Section 4 
below). 
With respect to the green growth priority, the main concern for managing authorities is 
that the emphasis on the climate change agenda may divert attention from the concept of 
sustainable development. The latter is already an overarching EU priority and is regarded as 
providing a more holistic, integrated perspective for addressing the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of development in tandem. Related, some managing authorities 
argue that the innovation and competitiveness priority should be viewed a means to 
achieve sustainable development and climate change goals, i.e. the low-carbon economy 
agenda should be viewed as an opportunity to develop new products, exports and 
competitiveness.  However, the extent to which this requires a new EU approach in the 
future is questioned. For instance, one managing authority argues that “ every new f irm 
st art -up, every business ext ension and every business rest ruct uring involves an upgrading 
t o newer t echnological  st andards” ; this automatically implies improved energy efficiency 
and waste management and thus contributes to a greener economy. Overall, the impact 
of this priority depends on current practice: several managing authorities did not regard the 
renewed emphasis on climate change as being particularly new, being in line with existing 
practice or domestic priorities. Indeed, Commission data show that Cohesion policy already 
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contributes 15 percent of its total budget to addressing the challenges posed by climate 
change, including mitigation and adaptation measures.9  
2.3 Concentration mechanisms 
In the current period, a greater concentration of resources on the Lisbon strategy was 
achieved in several ways: the requirement to link National Reform Programmes and 
National Strategic Reference Frameworks; the formulation of Community Strategic 
Guidelines on Cohesion; and the requirement for Member States to earmark  a minimum 
proportion of expenditure to specified spending categories supporting the Lisbon strategy 
(60 percent of expenditure in Convergence programmes, and 75 percent of expenditure in 
Regional Competitiveness & Employment programmes). 
The Commission have argued that this approach improved the alignment of Lisbon and 
Cohesion policy objectives and significantly increased Structural Funds spending in areas 
such as R&D and innovation.10 Equally, they have acknowledged that the broad range of 
intervention categories was excessive, that there is scope for more integration of EU 
priorities, and regional and local levels should be involved more effectively in delivering 
the Lisbon Strategy on the ground.11
For the post-2013 period, concentration is again foreseen in order to maximise the impact 
of the policy by focusing the policy on a small number of priorities to create a European-
wide critical mass of interventions and focus political and public attention on clear 
objectives.12 One possible option for concentrating resources is to continue with a form of 
earmarking. The Barca Report suggested that between 55-65 percent of Cohesion policy 
resources should be allocated to agreed priorities, with a fourchette for each core priority 
and the concentration requirement varying according to territory (highest in non-lagging 
regions, lowest in lagging regions). Member States would determine the distribution of 
resources among the core priorities in dialogue with the Commission. The Hübner 
reflections paper argued that the core priorities needed to be considerably more 
targeted, but that the selection of these core priorities should be the subject of a 
strategic political process involving the EU and Member States.13 The Samecki paper took a 
similar view. 
                                                 
9 European Commission (2008) Communication from the Commission on the results of the negotiations 
concerning cohesion policy strategies and programmes for the programming period 2007-2013, 
COM(2008) 301 final, Brussels. 
10 See, for example: Hübner, D. (2008) Cohesion pol icy and t he Lisbon Agenda, Speech to the 
Conference 2008-2010 and beyond: Lisbon Strategy and Cohesion Policy - European Regions facing 
future challenges, Bologna, 4 July 2008. 
11 DG Regio (2010a) High Level  Group Ref lect ing on Fut ure Cohesion Pol icy: Increased Coherence in 
t he Del ivery of  EU St rat egic Priorit ies, Meeting no. 3, 2 January 2010, Brussels. 
 
12 Samecki (2009a) op. cit . p.6 
 
13 Hübner D (2009) Ref lect ion paper on fut ure Cohesion Pol icy: Informal Meeting of Ministers for 
Regional Policy, Mariánské Lázne  22-24 April 2009, pp4-5. 
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The IQ-Net managing authorities are generally in favour of concentration using a menu 
approach, involving common priorities being adopted at EU level, with Member States (and 
regions) having the scope to interpret these in line with local needs and challenges and to 
determine the allocation of resources among the core priorities. (It was noted that a 
concentration of resources on 2-3 priorities is already characteristic of many RCE 
programmes.) As noted previously, the main concerns are how narrowly the core priorities 
would be determined and the danger of an increased thematisation of programmes  
whereby regional strategies are designed to meet top-down thematic priorities rather than 
having a territorial focus based on socio-economic analysis of development challenges. 
There is some support among managing authorities for the continued use of the current 
earmarking mechanism as a tool for achieving concentration. The recently approved 
position paper of the government of Steiermark, for instance, proposes that two-thirds of 
its future funding allocation for the post-2013 period should be earmarked for new 
innovation strategies.14 Although earmarking is sometimes considered to be a blunt 
instrument, this EU requirement strengthens the ability of managing authorities (at both 
national and regional levels) to argue for focused development strategies in the NSRFs and 
OPs, and to resist pressure from other government departments/agencies to disperse 
resources across a wide range of policy fields. Indeed, some managing authorities would 
prefer the earmarking requirement to have more stringent rules; one authority noted that 
the current earmarking rule simply involves an ex ante estimate of the likely use of funds, 
with effectiveness limited by the lack of EU-level sanctions when there are deviations in 
actual expenditure. Equally, other authorities emphasised the importance of earmarking 
rules being flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. In this context, the  
legislative proposal15 on the table to consider expenditure made outside the originally 
agreed earmarking codes as ineligible following a programme modification (even if it falls 
into another Lisbon category) is viewed as an unnecessary constraint. 
Among IQ-Net managing authorities, there is some recent experience in domestic policies to 
achieve greater concentration, which may provide lessons for Cohesion policy. For instance, 
in Slovenia, national development planning processes have adopted programme budgeting 
techniques (involving the allocation of funds to specific priorities) whilst seeking greater 
alignment between operational documents and strategic plans. The recent experience with 
Single Outcome Agreements in Scotland provides another example.16 Introduced in 2008, 
the model involves local authorities and community planning partnerships agreeing on 
strategic priorities for their local areas, specifying them as outcomes to be delivered (not 
specific tasks and activities), and showing how they contribute to a series of Scottish 
Government outcome goals which have been set for the next 10 years.  The priorities are 
financed through mainstream funding rather than ring-fenced grants - thus providing more 
local flexibility - and are monitored through a combination of locally defined indicators and 
                                                 
14 Position of the State of Styria  (Austria) on EU Regional Policy 2014 to 2020, Unanimous Decision by 
the Regional Government on 3 May 2010. 
15 Article 56 paragraph 3 of the proposed amendments to Council Regulation 1083/2006, COM(2009) 
384 final. 
16 For a more detailed review, see: Herbert S (2009) Single Outcome Agreements, SPICe briefing 
08/47, Scottish Parliament, Scotland: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-08/sb08-47.pdf
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regional indicators. Another option, formulated by the Sachsen-Anhalt Managing Authority is 
presented in Box 1. 
Box 1: Implementing concentration: proposal by the Sachsen-Anhalt Managing Authority 
 
The EU should provide a choice of possible priorities or themes, e.g. linked to the flagship initiatives 
under the Europe 2020 Strategy. For each priority, the EU should attach i) a context indicator and ii) 
a limited number of project level core indicators. The context indicators are important because they 
provide information on the broader socio-economic context and indicate whether there is a need to 
intervene in a specific field in a specific region. The core/project indicators can be seen as goals to 
be achieved and, if these were defined well, they would ensure a clear relationship between project 
funding and the achievement of specific goals, and also allow progress towards targets to be 
measured ex post. These two sets of indicators would be required for EU-level reporting; managing 
authorities could select additional indicators at project level if they wished. The EU level would also 
need to define a specific target group (e.g. school drop outs) to be addressed by each theme / 
project indicator. The process would function as follows: 
a) Each region would select the priorities (and associated context and core indicators) that it saw as 
most appropriate for its own case. 
b) Each region would decide how much funding they wanted to allocate to their chosen priorities. The 
regions would have to state clearly ex ante specific quantified targets in relation to the indicators for 
each priority. 
c) If a region decided to use several actions (or budget lines) to implement a specific priority, then 
there would also be a need for further levels of quantification. This means that the region would have 
to decide which indicator was useful at which level. 
d) Then each regional managing authority would put out domestic calls to ask for proposals on how 
these goals could be achieved.  
e) The MA would set quantified targets in relation to the indicators (and the funding allocations). 
Then the ex ante evaluator could assess whether these targets were too high/low, and the 
Commission could, if necessary, dispute the targets during the negotiations.  
The process would allow comparisons to be made between priorities (and actions) in terms of the 
extent to which they could and did achieve their goals (and also in terms of their cost effectiveness). 
It would facilitate a process of selection between instruments and end the current automatic 
approach to the allocation of funding before project specific goals and indicators are set. A number of 
potential difficulties with this approach include: 
a) Potential problems in the causal chain linking the funding and the project indicators, i.e. external 
factors could intervene that would prevent the goals (project indicators) from being reached. If goals 
were not reached, evaluations would be needed to investigate why e.g. goals might have been too 
ambitious or external factors might have intervened. 
b) It is difficult to select and define good indicators. If an indicator cannot be defined in very exact 
terms, then it should not be used.  
c) The process of setting priorities and selecting indicators is very political  even though some of the 
work has potentially already been done via the Europe 2020 document. Nevertheless, extensive 
discussions would need to take place soon at EU level on this approach e.g. to reach agreement on 
how the seven themes from Europe 2020 could be turned into Structural Funds priorities, and also on 
the two sets of indicators. 
d) This implies a need to start work soon i.e. in 2010, if the themes, indicators etc. are to be agreed 
before the beginning of the 2014+ period. In particular, the programme managers would need to know 
the themes and indicators well before the start of the period so that they could ensure that 
quantified targets were set in 2013  and also so that the electronic monitoring systems could be put 
in place before the start of the new period.  
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3. PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS 
A further key characteristic of the debate over the past year is the common perception that 
Cohesion policy needs to be more performance-oriented. The tendency to focus more on 
processes and financial absorption than on effectiveness and physical outcomes needs to 
be reversed, in the words of the new Commissioner Hahn.17 Several options have been 
suggested to achieve this, including the introduction or reinforcement of: conditionalities 
and incentives; monitoring and evaluation; strategic reporting; and institutional capacity 
building. 
3.1 Conditionalities and incentives 
Conditionalities and incentives are two mechanisms that have been proposed in the reform 
debates to support the pursuit of performance goals.  With conditionalities, the payment of 
funds is conditional on a certain level of performance, implying that funding could be lost if 
performance objectives and targets are not met.  By contrast, incentives imply a reward for 
performance. 
Conditionalities are already present in Cohesion policy, although they are mainly linked to 
procedural compliance (such as the approval of management and control systems) or 
spending (the n+2 rule), not performance considerations. Discussions at EU level have raised 
several possible options for the future:18  
x the application of macro-economic conditionalities for Member States or regions 
that fail to converge following several programme periods;  
x stronger additionality along with a revision of verification methods and effective 
sanctions; and 
x conditionalities related to a limited number of strategic priorities, involving setting 
targets and linking payments to their achievement.  
This latter proposal  a key recommendation from the Barca Report - has received a 
lukewarm response. A Council Presidency paper for the informal meeting of regional policy 
ministers in February 2010 noted that progress on t his proposal should be made wit h 
caut ion, as t he bureaucrat ic burden may unnecessari ly r ise and t here is a risk t hat  i t  ends 
up t urning int o a necessary procedure t hat  must  be overcome, t hus reducing t he usefulness 
of  t he exercise” . 19 The paper is also critical of the resource and time effort that will need 
to be invested in designing the new model, particularly in light of the considerable sunk 
costs in the establishment of the current governance model.  On the other hand, a way 
                                                 
17  Hahn J (2010) Evaluat ion of  ERDF Obj ect ives, 2000 – 2006,  Speech to the Debate on Synthesis 
Report at Bibliothèque Solvay, 19 April 2010, Brussels 
 
18 DG Regio (2010a) op. cit . 
 
19 Spanish Presidency (2010) Orient at ion document  for t he debate on t he fut ure of  Cohesion Pol icy, 
Informal Meet ing of  Minist ers of  Regional Pol icy, 19 February 2010, Zaragoza. 
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forward is also suggested: a pilot  proj ect  t hat  al lows developing a robust  met hodology 
….so t hat  a f inal  model appl icable t o al l  Member St at es could be subsequent ly 
developed.” 20
The methodological challenges associated with performance conditionalities and the 
potential for negative behavioural responses, were also highlighted by former Commissioner 
Samecki:  
“ Evaluat ion evidence t el ls us t hat  t oday t he capacit y t o est abl ish ex ante real ist ic 
t arget s for indicat ors is st i l l  not  suf f icient ly developed to build condit ional it ies on 
t his basis, in t he sense of  al locat ing addit ional  funds or wit hholding funds. The 
Commission it sel f  has dif f icul t ies t o j udge if  t arget s have been correct ly set , 
t aking int o account  t he diverse cont ext s in which t he pol icy is implemented. In 
addit ion, l inking resources t o t he achievement  of  t arget s wit hout  being sure t hat  
t hey are real ist ic, but  ambit ious can lead t o perverse behaviour, such as set t ing 
t hem art if icial ly low.” 21
There is some support for the use of performance conditionalities among IQ-Net managing 
authorities. It was noted that such sanctions may work at EU level if they were applied to 
clearly defined goals and targets, potentially with an assessment at the very end of the 
programme period or beyond.  An alternative suggestion  already catered for in the 
regulations - is that Member States could be responsible for sanctioning underperformance, 
allowing funds to be re-allocated across programmes within the country instead of being 
lost to the EU. For instance, this was done in Portugal during the final stages of the 2000-
2006 period; following an analysis of programme performance, funds were reallocated to 
specific programmes or to new types of interventions in line with new strategic goals. 
Clearly, such an approach would face difficulties in federal countries where national 
competencies are weaker in the domain of regional development, and adjudication on the 
performance of sub-national programmes may be more challenging. In such contexts, it was 
suggested that it may be preferable to encourage the application of performance 
conditionalities within programmes, e.g. between priorities or actions.  
For the most part, however, managing authorities were sceptical about performance 
conditionalities, citing a series of methodological difficulties.  
x targets may not be met for reasons that are unrelated to programme or 
performance management, and it would be unfair to sanction a programme in such 
circumstances;  
x performance is difficult to assess in the short to medium term because the 
achievement of objectives and the effects of programmes only become visible after 
the end of the programme period; 
                                                 
20 Spanish Presidency (2010) op.cit .  
 
21 Samecki, P. (2009b) Evaluat ion of  Cohesion Pol icy, Sixth European Conference on Evaluation of 
Cohesion Policy, 30 November 2009, Warsaw. 
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x the EU monitoring system is not able to monitor or measure outcomes and impacts 
on a comparative and robust basis - and if conditionalities are based on 
unsatisfactory indicators, then they cannot be effective or be applied fairly; and  
x the achievement of objectives will depend on how ambitious the targets are, which 
will vary systematically across the EU depending on managing authorities 
preferences, knowledge or negotiation skills. 
Aside from these methodological issues, four other criticisms were made relating to the 
underlying rationale, the impact on the quality of policy and the implications for policy 
management and administration.  
x Sanctions are not in line with the policys underlying cohesion philosophy, as they 
will probably further disadvantage those regions that need more help rather than 
less.  
x There is a danger of discouraging applicants from applying for support and from the 
adoption of new approaches, projects and experimental ways of working; recipients 
of support may shy away from innovation and innovative approaches if they feel 
that they might suffer if the project does not succeed. Managing authorities 
themselves may also become more risk averse, e.g. by subsuming funds into 
existing and safe government programmes.  
x Concerns were expressed about the addition of yet another layer of bureaucracy to 
the work of managing authorities. Moreover, unless the current management and 
control mechanisms are simplified it is seen as pointless or counterproductive to 
have additional performance requirements not least because the resources for 
managing performance will not increase.  
x There are significant political difficulties in implementing conditionalities. Ministers 
do not like shocks to their financial planning, and it is doubtful whether agreement 
could be reached to something that adds budgetary risk in a tight financial climate. 
Political tensions between different ministries may also be created or exacerbated, 
when funds are reallocated from one to another.  
A second approach to encourage performance is the use of financial or non financial 
incentives. Financial incentives could include a performance bonus for meeting objectives 
and targets. This is already possible on a voluntary basis in the current regulations, 
although very few Member States have taken up the option - the approach adopted in Italy 
is described below (see Box 2).  
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Box 2: The Performance Reserve in the Italian NSRF22
 
Stronger performance in the Mezzogiorno is being encouraged through the creation of a new 
performance reserve system linked to a series of service goals (obiet t ivi di servizio) to incentivise 
spending and concentrate investments on key strategic areas: education; services for the care of 
children and the elderly; management of urban waste; and, integrated water services. For each 
strategic area, a service target goal is identified and measured by appropriate quantitative 
indicators.  For each indicator  there are 11 in all  a target is identified for 2013. The achievement 
of these targets is linked to the distribution of a financial performance reserve, of c. 3 billion 
(premio f inanziario).   
All eight Mezzogiorno regions and the Ministry of Education participate in this performance reserve 
system. The amount of resources obtainable by each administration is based on allocation criteria and 
will be allocated on a pro-quota basis, i.e. based on the number of indicators for which the targets 
have been achieved. The achievement of the target values will be established in two stages, in 2009 
and 2013.  
x In 2009, part of the performance reserve resources were allocated on the basis of relative 
progress made from the baseline data towards the 2013 target values;  
x In 2013, the remaining funds will be allocated. A flexibility clause will be available entailing, 
for a maximum of four indicators chosen by each regional administration, the possibility to 
receive the maximum entitlement under the indicator simply by achieving 60 percent of the 
target value (however, for the flexibility clause to intervene, at least one indicator must 
have been achieved fully in each one of the four strategic areas).  
 
 
Lessons would evidently need to be drawn from the EU15 experience of the performance 
reserve during the 2000-06 period, widely acknowledged to have been unsuccessful. Not 
only was it administratively burdensome with limited performance-oriented benefits, but 
there was also evidence of perverse behaviour through the setting of artificially low 
targets.23 For such an instrument to work in the future it would clearly be dependent on 
the quality of targets set.24 Further, as with conditionalities, it may be more appropriate to 
link performance bonuses to specific priorities rather than whole programmes.  
Managing authorities have mixed views on performance bonuses. A shift to a performance-
orientated approach is certainly regarded as preferable to the current focus on spending 
and procedural correctness, and some managing authorities could see clear benefits in 
terms of supporting financial discipline and encouraging a focus on results. Among the key 
conditions mentioned for an effective performance bonus would be that it should only 
benefit the best regions, but involving real competition (implying a substantial extra 
budget for the top performers alone) and comparison on carefully chosen criteria that allow 
objective comparison between different regions/programmes (size, content, level of 
development etc.). 
                                                 
22 Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo e di Coesione (2007) Measurable obj ect ives for essent ial  
services: New chal lenges for regional  development  pol icy 2007-2013, Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico, Rome. For more detail see the dedicated website: 
http://www.dps.mef.gov.it/obiettivi_servizio/eng/ml.asp
 
23 Barca (2009) op.cit .  
 
24 DG Regio (2010) High Level Group Reflecting on Future Cohesion Policy: Focus on Results, Meeting 
No. 3, 25 January 2010, Brussels. 
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However, several criticisms were also expressed, many of which are similar to those made 
with respect to performance conditionalities. In measuring and assessing performance, 
previous experience shows that there are inherent difficulties in measuring good 
performance beyond the simplistic calculation of expenditure implementation. 
x This is seen as being a particular challenge in the EU context because performance 
concepts and definitions must not only be clear, but also acceptable to programmes 
across the EU.  
x There is scepticism about measuring and applying a performance bonus in an 
automatic way  for instance, if ten out of 20 output targets were met, then half 
the agreed amount would be paid. This way of working is considered by some 
managing authorities to be too strict and inflexible; using a simple arithmetic 
relationship to determine performance was also argued to be unfair because there 
may be good reasons why output targets have not been met.  
x Measurable outputs are not always the best and most effective outputs. This is an 
issue for ESF interventions focusing on hard to reach groups in Scotland, where 
success is judged as a movement along a journey. If the focus is switched to easily 
measurable projects, this will have negative implications for projects such as these 
which are expensive and strategically important but difficult to measure from an 
output perspective.  
x Similarly, the use of core indicators that measure short-term success in programmes 
that have a long-term orientation was criticised.  
Financial incentives may also have perverse consequences for programme management and 
project quality. The operation of automatic rules which do not take account of context, 
specific circumstances or the efforts made can be discouraging for beneficiaries. From a 
management perspective, there are concerns that a performance bonus may make 
programmes and project selection more conservative and risk-averse, an approach that 
would not encourage regions in moving into new and more competitive forms of economic 
activity. It may lead to a focus on quick rather than strategic spend, as well as competition 
rather than cooperation among regions. In addition, there are concerns that such a system 
might bring with it a considerable administrative burden if it is imposed as a formal 
obligation.  
Aside from these critical comments, three positive suggestions were made which may 
provide a more promising basis for introducing financial incentives.  
x The use of financial incentives at the project level could be encouraged. In Poland, 
the idea of a bonus system to encourage applicants to prepare projects which 
contribute in an effective way to the attainment of development objectives is being 
discussed. This would be introduced for those who spend available resources in the 
best and most effective way. A similar approach already operates for some business 
aid schemes in Portugal. Also at project level, it was suggested that incentives 
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could be used to encourage the use expertise and peer reviews at the project 
preparation stage.  
x Another possible approach would be for the Commission to retain a share of funds 
to be allocated on a competitive basis at EU level via specific calls, using a model 
comparable to the Regional Innovation Programmes or Innovative Actions in 2000-
06. It was argued that only a small share of funds should be allocated this way so 
that the decentralised approach to Cohesion policy implementation is not 
undermined.  
x Lastly, financial incentives could have a supra-national dimension, e.g. focusing on 
EU-level macro-regions like the Baltic Sea area. 
Turning to non-financial incentives, options raised in the reform debates include public 
rankings of projects or programmes at EU or national level and the introduction of peer 
review processes involving formal recommendations and benchmarking, replicating the 
OECD model of territorial reviews. This idea was viewed positively by many managing 
authorities.  However, benchmarking was also criticised because of the lack of 
comparability between diverse regions, and the unpredictability and negotiability of peer 
reviews was mentioned as a drawback. 
Finally, existing non-financial incentives could be strengthened. Some positive experiences 
were mentioned with respect to benchmarking of performance in countries which had 
stimulated competition amongst regions, although overly focused on financial 
implementation. Competitions such as RegioStars and publicity for, or exchange of, good 
practices are generally supported by managing authorities. To be effective, best-practice 
conferences need to be well organised and prepared and should not just lead to civil 
servant tourism, in the words of one managing authority. The exchange of best practice is 
also an area where managing authorities would like the Commission to take a more 
proactive role. It was suggested that this could even be extended to Monitoring 
Committees, with the Commission providing information on best-practice projects and 
management practices from across Europe.  
3.2 Monitoring and evaluation 
The use of conditionalities and incentives depends on reliable and credible information and 
evidence on policy performance, and it is the task of monitoring and evaluation systems to 
provide this material. Cohesion policy is today probably the most evaluated EU policy25 
and has been instrumental in spreading evaluation culture across Europe. It can also draw 
on institutionalised monitoring systems and practice which have seen significant 
improvements over successive periods, involving: greater concentration on key and fewer 
indicators; better data quality; standardisation in indicator definitions and methods across 
programmes; and more systematic and reliable data collection processes and IT systems.26 
                                                 
25 Hahn, J. (2010) op.cit .  
 
26 Ward T (2010) Ex-post  evaluat ion of  Cohesion pol icy programmes 2000-2006 f inanced by t he ERDF 
in Obj ect ive 1 and 2 Regions Report, DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels;  
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Monitoring is also being increasingly used as an operational decision-making tool, 
particularly with the stronger emphasis on early-warning indicators and systems in the 
current period. Notwithstanding these positive trends, managing authorities often report 
ongoing challenges associated with:  
x Unrealistic target setting or flawed baselines: is a general problem across EU 
programmes, often due to limited experience and/or weaknesses in the databases  
x Variable data quality/methods: data quality is not consistently reliable at 
programme level, especially in terms of physical indicators; and it is often difficult 
to aggregate indicator values at the national level, not least because of the 
inherent difficulties in agreeing common indicator definitions and methods across 
large numbers of regions/programmes.  
x Data collection and administration difficulties: not all beneficiaries take their 
monitoring obligations seriously, while managing authorities often complain about 
being overloaded with monitoring requirements. From a regulatory perspective, the 
lack of proportionality in monitoring obligations in relation to the size/scale of 
programmes is criticised.  
x Limited utility: monitoring data are not fully exploited in decision-making 
processes. Indicator definition and selection tends to be insufficiently integrated 
into the early stages of programme formulation, while there is limited use of 
monitoring data as a management tool at the implementation stage, e.g. in 
assessing whether funds should be reallocated between interventions. A frequently 
mentioned obstacle in this regard is an excessive number of indicators.   
At the EU level, there are similar weaknesses in core indicators. A more systematic 
approach has been adopted in this period, but it is still not possible to aggregate 
achievements - some Member States have not reported data at all, and data on both targets 
and achievements was rarely reported during the strategic reporting exercise.27 Other 
criticisms raised by IQ-Net managing authorities included: 
x Timing: Commission guidance was rather late and the introduction of core 
indicators after the programmes were approved has added to the complexity of 
monitoring systems, which could result in further challenges later in the period.  
x Types of indicator: there is an excessive focus on number of projects rather than 
quality-related indicators or on results/impacts. 
                                                                                                                                            
Bachtler J, Polverari L, Orae H, Clement K and Tödtling-Schönhofer H (2009) Ex post evaluation of 
the management and implementation of Cohesion policy, 2000-06 (ERDF), Report to DG Regio, 
European Commission, Brussels; Polverari L, Mendez C, Gross F and Bachtler (2007) Making Sense of 
European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 Ongoing Evaluation and Monitoring Arrangements, IQ-Net  Themat ic 
Paper 21(2), Glasgow. 
27Pacillo, L. (2010) Nat ional  St rat egic Report s, Overview of  core indicat ors and evaluat ion resul t s, 
Evaluation Network Meeting, February 25th 201, Brussels. 
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x Definitional: the Commissions acceptance of flexibility in the definition of 
indicators has undermined the comparability of information. 
x Scope: the approach is fragmented because core indicators have only been defined 
for the ERDF and Cohesion Fund, not the ESF. 
Part of the solution would be to make core indicators and target-setting obligatory, as has 
been proposed in the Samecki paper.28 It would also seem appropriate for the Commission 
to propose a harmonised approach to core indicator definitions, methods and reporting 
requirements if the indicators are to provide a useful tool for facilitating comparison, peer 
review and  high-level strategic debate. Beyond the issue of core indicators, no concrete 
ideas have been advanced at this stage of the reform debate on how to improve monitoring 
systems at the national level. The ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 period acknowledges 
that the obstacles are as much political as technical and that acceptance is needed by 
the Member States and managing authorities themselves of the need for a more effective 
approach.29 Moreover, it is generally recongised that effective monitoring  as well as 
evaluation - will depend on the quality of the programming stage. Clearly defined 
objectives and targets are essential, which in turn would be facilitated by greater 
selectivity and concentration on priorities (Section 2). The introduction of performance 
incentives and conditionalities (Section 3.1) and the strengthening of EU strategic oversight 
(Section 3.3) would similarly help to drive up standards and increase the political 
commitment to monitoring.  
Turning to evaluation, a radical shift in the EU approach has been witnessed in the current 
period through the adoption of a more flexible and needs based system, in essence 
devolving responsibility for the timing, focus and methodological approach to the Member 
States. Analyses of national and programme evaluation plans suggest that the Member 
States and regions have embraced the new requirements in a positive way, as evidenced by 
the wide range of planned evaluations across the EU.30 As with monitoring, evaluation is 
subject to important challenges. Although not always directly attributable to the regulatory 
framework, the most commonly cited difficulties are as follows. 
x Several managing authorities note that evaluation is sometimes perceived as an 
additional obligation that must be undertaken to comply with the regulations, 
rather than as a genuine tool to improve the quality of programmes. In some cases, 
this is due to the small size of programmes and the view that they cannot have a 
discernable impact on regional development. The relative priority attached to 
evaluation can also vary at different territorial levels. The institutionalisation of 
evaluation tends to be stronger at national level, while the political backing at the 
regional level is not always achieved.  
                                                 
28 Samecki P (2009a)  and (2009a) op.cit . 
29 Ward (2010) op.cit. p167. 
30 Polverari et  al .  (2007); Mendez C and Kah S (2009) Programme Implementation in Times of 
Economic Crisis: Review of Programme Implementation Winter 2008-Spring 2009, IQ-Net  Review 
Paper, 24(1), Glasgow. 
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x Questions persist about the quality and utility of evaluation reports. Much of this is 
due to the limited availability and quality of data, as noted above. However, there 
are also institutional capacity weaknesses within managing authorities, particularly 
given the burdens imposed by other aspects of administration.31 The expertise of 
external evaluators is sometimes questionable, particularly when it comes to 
formulating practical or technical recommendations.  
x There tends to be little discussion of evaluation findings among policy stakeholders 
and beneficiaries. This is sometimes due to the lack of effort by managing 
authorities to diffuse evaluation reports and results beyond monitoring committee 
meetings.  But even where a more pro-active effort is adopted, there is often a lack 
of interest amongst stakeholders in discussing evaluation findings.   
Box 3: Ongoing evaluation in Sweden 
 
The new approach to ongoing evaluation is regarded as being the main strength of the evaluation 
system and a major improvement on the past practice of mid-term evaluation in terms of utility for 
programme managers and project promoters.32 Ongoing evaluation takes place at three levels:  
a) project level: to improve projects while they are running and to gather knowledge for the future;  
b) programme level: following the development of the programme, also improving ongoing 
programme implementation; 
c) joint ongoing evaluation: of the ESF and ERDF implementation systems.  
At the project level, particularly large projects or those that are deemed to be of strategic interest 
(about 100 at the moment) contract an ongoing evaluator. At the programme level, three teams of 
consultants report to the three monitoring committees. With support from the ESF managing 
authority, the entire implementation system is evaluated.33 University courses on ongoing evaluation 
are now also being offered in Sweden. While the evaluation system itself will be evaluated later on in 
the period, initial responses have been very positive. At the outset, large project promoters and some 
regions resisted ongoing evaluation, fearing new restrictions or additional auditing. However, the 
feedback from stakeholders is now positive, and there is increasing recognition of the benefits that 
evaluation can bring to projects and the system more generally.  
 
The Barca Report proposals on evaluation include more rigorous ex-ante (or prospective) 
evaluation of programmes and a greater focus on impact evaluations at the level of specific 
interventions using appropriate methods (especially counterfactual methodologies34). The 
Report also stresses that responsibility for evaluation should remain with the Member 
States, while the Commission should focus on promoting evaluation by creating an EU 
clearing house for collecting, filtering and making accessible studies and their results. 
                                                 
31 SWECO (2010) The Administ rat ive Cost s of  EU Cohesion Pol icy, Final Report to DG Regio, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
 
32 Svensson, L., Brulin, G., Jansson., S. and Sjöberg, K. (Eds.) (2009) Learning Through Ongoing 
Evaluat ion, Lund, Studentlitteratur. 
 
33 See also Brulin, G. and Jansson, S. (2009) A new programming period, a new evaluation approach!, 
in Svensson et al (2009) op. cit . pp. 41-57. 
 
34 Business support is a strong candidate for such evaluation methods, as reflected in long-standing 
academic research on this form of regional policy assistance in the UK  see also the pilot studies 
undertaken in Germany for the 2000-06 ex-post evaluation of Cohesion policy (Ward (2010) op.cit . 
pp73-75). 
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These proposals are generally supported by the Samecki paper, although ex-ante evaluation 
is not mentioned. Additionally, the paper calls for evaluation plans to be formally required 
for all programmes and for summative evaluation to be carried out towards the end of the 
programme period to feed into EU-wide syntheses. 
Among IQ-Net managing authorities, there is universal and strong support for the new 
needs-based and flexible approach adopted in the current period. In some cases, there is 
evidence that this added flexibility has enabled policy-makers to set up a more ambitious 
and positive approach to evaluation than previously, as in Sweden (see Box 3). 
In the light of these experiences, the main concern for the future is that evaluation 
requirements do not become more stringent or an administrative burden as this would 
detract from the underlying aims of a performance orientation and the utility of evaluation. 
Some caution was also expressed about the methodological proposals on prospective and 
impact evaluation. Current experiences suggest that the available methods and findings of 
these types of evaluation are not sufficiently robust to guide decision-making. Similarly, 
counterfactual evaluation is a theoretically sound idea, but finding an objective control 
group that eliminates selection bias is far from straightforward.  
The key areas identified where there is scope for improvement are as follows.  
x Thematic evaluation: programme evaluation is considered important, but more 
weight should be given to thematic evaluation of specific instruments/interventions 
and of the contribution of these to EU priorities. 
x Ex-ante evaluation: some managing authorities would welcome strengthened ex-
ante evaluation - given the strategic importance of this stage in shaping programme 
design decisions - although others argue that there is already a lot of evaluation 
feeding into the design of programmes. To reduce workloads and maximise 
synergies, it was suggested that ex-ante evaluation could be integrated into the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment where relevant.  
x Project evaluation: more could be done to assess the effects at project level, 
particularly through the use of counterfactual methods, i.e. by comparing firms and 
other beneficiaries that have received funds with those that have not; improved ex-
ante, cost-benefit analysis of projects and of their environmental impact is also 
regarded as desirable.   
x Capacity: It is recognised that more could be done to strengthen evaluation 
capacity in the Member States. A greater focus on internal evaluation could 
improve quality and utility, although it was also noted that an objective, external 
perspective is important and that evaluators need to be trained to provide more 
practically-oriented recommendations.  
x Publicity and exchange of experiences: the presentation of evaluation findings 
should not be confined to programme monitoring committees but need wider 
publicity. It was suggested that this could be achieved if the Commission organised 
mid-term conferences or required the Member States to organise such conferences, 
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particularly at the mid-term stage of programme implementation. More effort could 
also be placed on sharing the results across Member States, preferably in a targeted 
way involving small workshops and recognised experts.  
3.3 Strategic reporting  
EU-wide political debate on the effectiveness of Cohesion policy is considered to be an 
important stimulus to a more results-oriented approach. The inadequacy of current 
arrangements was heavily criticised by the Barca Report, as well as by some Member States, 
which called for the creation of a formal Council grouping on Cohesion Policy to meet 2-4 
times a year for regular high-level debate on policy effectiveness and to ensure 
accountability to the public on the achievements of the policy. The 2007-13 period has seen 
moves in this direction with the introduction of strategic reporting, an important new 
dimension of the policys governance architecture. The Member State strategic reports 
(2009 and 2012) and the Commissions synthesis (in 2010 and 2013) addressed to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions are precisely aimed at increasing transparency and accountability by 
involving the other European institutions in a dialogue on the policys performance.  
Although an EU-level political debate will not be held until Council conclusions are 
presented (by the General Affairs Council in June 2010), the Commission has provided a 
positive assessment of the first exercise which it considers to have provided:35  
x an important improvement in the accountability of the delivery of policy 
objectives;  
x a promising basis for building a more thorough peer review process; 
x and a valuable monitoring tool, bringing important and timely information about 
the potential of the policy to support the economic recovery and to contribute to 
the future Europe 2020 strategy. 
The principles and goals of strategic reporting are generally supported by IQ-Net managing 
authorities, but some important limitations were noted. In many cases, the exercise is seen 
as a compliance exercise with limited or uncertain benefits in terms of strategic added 
value or policy impact. This can partly be explained by the delayed start of the programmes 
and the limited implementation progress on which to report, although several 
methodological challenges were considered to have impacted on the quality and value of 
the reports too:  
x poor monitoring data and evaluation evidence across the EU;  
x a lack of comparable data across programmes in some countries;  
                                                 
35 European Commission (2010) Cohesion pol icy: St rat egic Report  2010 on t he implement at ion of  t he 
programmes 2007-2013, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
COM(2010)110 final, Brussels. 
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x the rather vague and late guidance provided by the Commission; and 
x unnecessary duplication with more comprehensive domestic reporting processes or 
Lisbon reporting on NRPs at EU level. 
Despite these weaknesses, many managing authorities are supportive of strategic reporting 
and are sympathetic to proposals for improving the process, including: introducing a more 
structured high-level debate in the Council; providing a more systematic effort to diffuse 
the results within the Member States; and a closer alignment with the Europe 2020 
strategy. Suggestions were also made on how to improve the content, such as: reducing the 
scope and concentrating on strategic issues; a stronger focus on the analysis of added value 
of Cohesion policy compared to domestic policies; and a standardised approach across the 
EU on the basis of more detailed guidance or a common set of jointly defined and simple 
core indicators to be used by all programmes. 
3.4 Institutional capacity 
It is increasingly recognised that a key determinant of performance in Cohesion policy is 
institutional capacity, in terms of having the necessary resources, skills, structures and 
good governance principles in place at national, regional and local levels.36 Cohesion policy 
is itself credited as having strengthened administrative structures and organisational 
cultures across Europe over successive periods through its programme design and 
implementation requirements, and the focus on institutional capacity building has been 
reinforced in the current period by making it a key priority for ESF support under the 
Convergence Objective. Yet there is scope for a stronger emphasis in future cohesion 
policy on the development of effective institutions, perhaps with associated incentives and 
conditionalities37 according to the Hübner reflections, while the Samecki paper 
emphasised the need for enhanced attention to know-how capacity building, strategy 
development and networks.38
Institutional capacity is not considered to be a major problem for many IQ-Net managing 
authorities. Some noted that capacity challenges have arisen in particular programmes and 
regions (the case of the Mezzogiorno is an often cited example in the Italian context) or in 
local authorities at the applicant level. It is also recognised that capacity needs depend 
largely on the scale and complexity of individual programmes. In this context, there is a 
perception that challenges are more of an issue in the newer Member States due to the 
massive increase in the scale of funding during this period and because they have less 
experience in managing EU funds. On the other hand, the point was made that it is not 
simply a question of new versus old member States; all Member States at different levels 
                                                 
36 Bachtler et  al .  (2009) op.cit ; Ederveen, S., De Groot, H. and Nahuis, R. (2006) Fertile soil for 
Structural Funds? A panel data analysis of the conditional effectiveness of European Cohesion policy, 
Kyklos, 59: 1742. 
 
37 Hübner (2007) op.cit . p3. 
 
38 Samecki (2009a) op.cit . p7. 
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could improve their institutional capacities, especially in terms of performance oriented 
tasks.  
Where capacity difficulties do arise, the most acute challenges are related to staffing 
levels, turnover and quality. 
x High staff turnover: can be a major difficulty as the implementation of the 
Structural Funds requires specialised knowledge and skills.  This is a particular 
problem in the EU12, often due to relatively lower pay conditions compared to the 
private sector (partly addressed in at least one country through increased salaries 
for public sector staff working on the Structural Funds). Staff turnover is also an 
issue in the EU15, particularly in countries where there is a public administration 
culture of rotating staff to different posts or policy areas, or where short-term 
contracts are increasingly used, which means that institutional memory and 
professionalism can be lost.  
x Staff shortages and stretched resources: are related and commonly reported 
challenges. This is often due to a perception that programme administrative 
requirements (especially in audit and control) are becoming increasingly and 
disproportionately onerous or because of the additional workloads involved in 
dealing with overlapping programme periods.  
x Skills deficits: recruiting staff with the right skill sets can be a challenge. For 
instance, one managing authority usually recruits directly from universities but has 
found a particular shortage of economists; and there have been instances where 
extra effort has been expended to ensure that new staff have a good understanding 
of regional development concepts, terminology and knowledge only for trained 
individuals to move on to other jobs.  
At the structural level, the main reported challenges are organisational inefficiency or 
duplication. For instance, a managing authority in the EU12 noted that there are risks of 
inefficiency and duplication in a system where implementation responsibilities are shared 
between national and regional levels. By contrast, the Austrian model  where managing 
authority functions are carried out at regional Land) level authority, with coordination at 
federal level through the ÖROK,39 with an emphasis on informal coordination mechanisms  
is regarded as providing an efficient and effective example of ways to allocate tasks.  
Cohesion policy already provides direct, funded support for institutional capacity building. 
In some IQ-Net countries there is a specific strategic priority or targeted interventions for 
improving administrative efficiency to improve policy design and implementation (e.g. 
Greece, Italy, Poland) and/or the public administration more generally (Greece, Poland, 
Slovenia, Portugal). A key question is whether there is a need for Commission support in 
this area. Among the more radical proposals are:40  
                                                 
39 Österreichische Raumordnungskonferenz (Austrian Spatial Planning Conference) 
40 Bachtler et  al .  (2009) op.cit ; Barca (2009) op.cit . 
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x for DG REGIO to develop an institutional capacity unit to support institutional 
capacity-building in the Member States; and 
x more use of special purpose bodies for managing and implementing programmes 
or specific priorities/measures and operating at arms length from government 
departments and with Commission oversight. 
There is generally limited support (among IQ-Net managing authorities) for a more pro-
active Commission role in developing institutional capacity. Concern was expressed about 
Commission interference in domestic matters, and it was argued that institutional 
capacity issues should be addressed at the initiative of domestic authorities. For instance, 
the importance of a well-functioning electronic system was emphasised for supporting good 
management of large and complex programmes or for achieving rationalisation. The use of 
ITCs also provides a useful tool for supporting managing authorities on technical regulatory 
issues and improving coherence across programmes (see Box 4). 
Box 4: Rationalising information dissemination through a regulatory support platform in 
France 
 
Created by DATAR at the end of 2009, the main objectives of the regulatory support platform (plat e-
forme d’ appui réglement aire) are to provide programme managers with all of the regulatory 
requirements on the Structural Funds and to offer regulatory support via a question-and-answer 
system. Covering all programmes and funds, it aims to provide for a more efficient system of 
organising information and dealing with requests, particularly by sharing responses. The platform is 
coordinated by DATAR and the ESF unit in the Ministry of Employment (DGEFP) in collaboration with a 
steering committee with representation from national ministries, the audit authority and programme 
managers. These actors must agree on a single position on the queries. 
The platform is targeted at Managing Authorities, audit and certifying authorities, regional councils 
and ministries. A manager receives and classifies the questions, which may then be given an 
immediate response if the questions are simple, while more complicated requests are validated by 
resource staff, the steering committee or an associated expert.  
 
A more promising area for Commission intervention in institutional capacity building was 
seen to be the organisation of seminars and training. The various initiatives undertaken by 
the Commission in recent years are viewed positively, such as the train the trainers 
seminar for managing and certifying authorities where Commission officials are responsible 
for training country officials who then train officials in their countries and so on. However, 
these events have largely concerned technical matters relating to financial management, 
audit and control. In this context, a number of managing authorities stressed that 
strengthened institutional capacity is also needed within the Commission services, 
particularly to be equipped to examine and discuss strategic policy issues (see Section 7.1 
below).  
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4. STRATEGIC COHERENCE BETWEEN POLICIES AND FUNDING 
INSTRUMENTS 
A coherent approach to Structural Funds has been a goal of the EU since 1988, when the 
Funds were reformed to achieve improved coordination of the structural instruments.41 
Since then, the relationship between the different Funds and, latterly, the relationship 
between different structural policies (Cohesion policy, rural development policy, fisheries 
policy) and other EU policies with a territorial dimension, has been extensively discussed 
during each reform debate. The current period has seen attempts to achieve a more 
strategic approach to EU funding through frameworks and guidelines based on the Lisbon 
strategy, but with mixed success.  
There is a broad consensus among almost all IQ-Net managing authorities that the more 
strategic approach introduced for the 2007-13 period has been largely positive. Although 
the Community Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion were very broad, the process of 
translating them into National Strategic Reference Frameworks had three major benefits:  
x it has helped to al ign dif ferent  EU and domest ic funding st reams under the same 
priorities, notably the Lisbon agenda; 
x it has led to more coherence across programmes within individual Member States, 
providing (in some countries) the basis for engagement and exchange-of-experience 
between managing authorities; and  
x in some countries, it has significantly shif t ed t he focus of  programme spending in 
the direction of R&D and innovation and away from infrastructure support, and has 
encouraged more funding to be channelled into larger and more strategic projects. 
The perceived drawbacks are threefold. First, while in theory there should have been a link 
between the National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and the NSRFs, in practice the NRPs and 
NSRFs varied considerably in their connections and complementarities. The documents 
often contained broad references to their shared goals but contain much less information 
on how future Structural Funds programmes should contribute to the NRPs and vice versa. 
Of particular concern for some managing authorities is the lack of a territorial dimension to 
the Lisbon Strategy, which has been interpreted in an overly-thematic or sector manner in 
the NSRFs and implementation of Structural Funds programmes.42
Second, while the earmarking of expenditure has been effective in narrowing down the 
fields of intervention, the categories are very broad (as noted earlier). Strategic focus is 
                                                 
41 European Commission (1989) Guide to the reform of the Communitys Structural Funds, Commission 
of the European Communities, Brussels, p.9. 
42 This issue has been explored further in previous IQ-Net research  see: Polverari L, McMaster I, 
Gross F, Bachtler J, Ferry M and Yuill D (2005) Strategic Planning for Structural Funds in 2007-
2013: A Review of Strategies and Programmes, IQ-Net  Themat ic Paper No. 18(2), European 
Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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reduced to a rather crude measure of expenditure, without meaningful sanctions for non-
achievement. 
Third, in some IQ-Net countries, the strategic coherence across Funds has diminished. 
Managing authorities report less joined up approaches to programme management and 
project funding through ERDF and ESF. More difficult still are the relationships between 
Structural Funds and Rural Development programmes; coherence is advocated at the level 
of the CSG and NSRFs and in programme documents, but in practice the difficult tasks of 
dealing with overlap in eligibility rules, duplication of funding and coordination fall on 
project selection committees. In at least one country, the EAFRD no longer has a regional 
dimension and has lost its focus on economic development - being perceived as 
compensation for farmers for lower support on the first pillar of the CAP.43 Another 
managing authority reports that government departments responsible for the different 
Funds deliberately seek differentiation and interpret rules differently. 
These concerns have also been reflected in the papers to the High-Level Group. Evidence 
suggests that there is sometimes a lack of a strategic vision for the coordinated use of 
Community funds, leading to artificial delimitations of intervention areas and 
fragmentation of EU funding. Furthermore, stakeholders underline that the different rules, 
procedures, practices, guidelines and interpretations hinder the effective and efficient 
implementation. Evaluation research underlines that complementarity and cooperation 
between the Funds is necessary for effective and efficient delivery at regional level.44
Proposals for the future include the establishment of a single strategic framework at EU 
level, joint programming and a different alignment of funding instruments: There is a 
broad consensus on the need for better coordination between Cohesion Policy and other 
Community Policies and policy instruments.45  The Samecki orientations paper made two 
suggestions for increasing coherence in the delivery of strategic priorities: 
x the establishment of a single strategic framework to provide strategic orientations 
for all Community funds under shared management (cohesion, employment, rural 
development, fisheries) and possibly directly managed policies (e.g. research, 
transport, enterprise, energy) also; 
x better alignment of funding instruments, with harmonised rules and procedures 
among Funds, more flexibility for cross-financing between ERDF and ESF, and 
shifting the EAFRD axis 3 (rural diversification) and axis 4 (LEADER) into Cohesion 
policy. 
                                                 
43 See also: Davies, S. et al (2008) Sust ainable Rural  and Regional  Development : Del ivering Coherence 
and Added Value in Europe, Background Paper for the Sub Rosa meeting on A strategic discussion on 
the future of EU regional and rural policies, 29 February  1 March 2008, European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
44 METIS (2009) Ex post  evaluat ion of  Cohesion pol icy programmes 2000-06: Rural  development , Final 
Report to the European Commission (DG Regio), Metis, Vienna. 
 
45 D Regio (2010a) op. cit . 
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IQ-Net managing authorities are strongly supportive of a common strategic framework, 
although they have different views on what this means in practice  and some scepticism of 
what is achievable. The primary concern is to have an umbrella strategy for cohesion at 
EU level. With the EU Treaty containing a commitment to economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, it is argued by some managing authorities that the EU should have an overarching 
EU-level framework for cohesion that guides all relevant policies (not just Cohesion policy 
and other structural policies, but policies like R&D and enterprise support). Of particular 
importance to several authorities is the need for horizontal policies like Competition policy 
control of State aid and environment policies to be coordinated better with Cohesion policy 
at a strategic level.  
The key requirement for such an umbrella strategy is that it simplifies the framework. A 
major concern for IQ-Net managing authorities is that a new strategic framework does not 
introduce another layer of strategy but genuinely replaces and rationalises the current 
multiple sets of strategies and guidelines.  
Although desirable in principle, several managing authorities questioned the realism and 
consequence of such a framework, on several grounds: 
x given the complexity and diversity of the objectives of different policies, securing 
agreement on an umbrella strategy may only be possible at a high level of 
generality, potentially rendering the strategy more-or-less meaningless; 
x greater strategic coherence and policy coordination at EU level would need to be 
mirrored by similar approaches at Member State level  which is considered 
unrealistic in many countries given the persistent sectoralism in government 
administration and the management of public expenditure; and  
x a single framework could actually weaken Cohesion policy, by diverting resources 
and responsibilities for implementing Cohesion objectives to other policy areas. 
In the view of some IQ-Net managing authorities, a more realistic goal would be to focus on 
a single framework for structural policies, in particular for Structural Funds and Rural 
Development, which includes the following proposals: 
x joint development of a single set of Community strategic guidelines; 
x harmonisation of ERDF/ESF and EARDF rules and procedures (financial management, 
data management, monitoring, reporting etc); 
x joint programming of operations  either at national or regional levels, depending 
on the Member State  with common indicators and targets; 
x a single managing authority in the Member States (or regions) to have overall 
responsibility for managing all three Funds, potentially with separate intermediate 
bodies for each of the Funds; 
x a single audit authority and audit regime; and 
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x inter-DG working groups in the Commission to enhance communication, potentially 
including a mission in the Secretariat, and exchanges of officials. 
Some go further to support the Samecki proposal for integrating parts of the EARDF (Axes 3 
and 4) into the ERDF, on the basis that development needs in rural areas could be 
addressed by requiring each OP to include at least one rural priority. 
Not all managing authorities regard common programming as the solution, particularly 
where responsibility for Cohesion policy and Rural Development is shared differently 
between national and regional levels, or where joint programming would introduce a new 
source of complexity.46 It was noted that major changes would inevitably create 
uncertainty and delays while new arrangements are understood/implemented, and that 
stability is important to building institutional capacity. Instead, several recommendations 
for improving operational coordination under the existing institutional arrangements were 
put forward: 
x facilitating exchange of experience on effective ways of facilitating cooperation in 
the implementation of EU policies (e.g. between Cohesion and Rural Development 
policies, or between Structural Funds and FP7). Examples include: cross-
membership of Structural Funds and Rural Development monitoring committees; co-
locating the managing authorities for different Funds (Sweden); creating a rural 
sub-committee under Structural Funds PMCs (Finland); appointing coordination 
officers/units at regional or sub-regional levels (Italy); or joint learning 
conferences (Sweden): 
x addressing specific regulatory anomalies, for example where the eligibility rules 
differ; 
x enabling Member States to use multi-fund programmes where they facilitate 
integrated implementation; 
x creating more flexibility for implementation, especially through a greater scale and 
scope for cross-financing, at regional and sub-regional levels (although this can also 
complicate implementation);  
x more transparency in the regional and sub-regional allocation of spending to 
projects under different EU funding streams, as a way of prompting local/regional 
thinking about linkages between policies/funds; and 
x investing in the institutional capacity at regional and local levels to enhance their 
ability to facilitate an integrated approach. 
 
                                                 
46 There is also no clear support for a merger of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund. 
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5. TERRITORIAL COOPERATION AND COHESION 
Territorial cooperation is often highlighted as one of the main areas of added value of 
Cohesion policy, with strong support from European institutions, Member States, regions 
and other stakeholders. Several proposals have been put forward for strengthening 
territorial cooperation, either as part of the territorial cohesion debate or to increase the 
added value of Cohesion policy. These include developing the relationship between 
spending under regional programmes and (for example) cross-border or transnational 
programmes; a stronger focus on cooperation with neighbourhood countries; strengthening 
of the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC); and basing future programmes 
outside the Convergence objective on functional regions (e.g. macro-regions, cross-border 
regions).  
This is part of a wider debate about the need for an integrated approach to territorial 
development in order to exploit fully territorial potentials for growth. The argument is that 
effective exploitation of natural resources, human resources, innovation, entrepreneurship 
etc requires more cooperation between regions to reduce the barriers to interaction and 
the movement of goods and people.47 The challenge is how to govern so-called soft spaces 
 territorial scales for planning, strategy development or intervention that do not fall 
exclusively within local, regional or national jurisdictions.48
Utilising the reasoning in the Barca Report, the Hübner reflections paper highlighted the 
importance of the territorial dimension in Cohesion policy to enable the integrated delivery 
of public goods and services to be tailored to the needs of particular places.49 Further, the 
need to find common solutions to shared problems would require a stronger commitment to 
territorial cooperation, potentially with an overall EU strategy to provide a framework for 
co-operation activities. Subsequently, the Samecki orientation paper stated that one of 
three future policy goals should be to foster integration across borders, and it suggested 
that the scale and nature of territorial cooperation could be reinforced through functional 
macro-regions (e.g. Baltic Sea, Danube Basin).50  
Current proposals seek to exploit better the strategic potential of European territorial 
cooperation by anchoring cooperation in strategic documents, improving the linkage with 
Convergence and RCE programmes and better programme preparation. The architecture of 
territorial cooperation is also under review (e.g. rationalisation of the number of strands) 
                                                 
47 European Commission (2009) Territ orial  cohesion: unleashing t he t errit orial  pot ent ial, Background 
Document to the Conference on Cohesion Policy and Territorial Development: Making Use of the 
Territorial Potential!, Kiruna, Sweden, 10-11 December 2009. Damsgaard O, Lindqvist M, Roto J and 
Sterling J (2009) Territ orial  pot ent ials in t he European Union, Nordregio Working Paper 2009:6, 
Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Stockholm. 
 
48 Faludi, A. (2010) Territ orial  Cohesion under t he Looking Glass, Synthesis paper about the history of 
the concept and policy background to territorial cohesion,  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/pdf/lookingglass.pdf  
 
49 Hübner (2009) op. cit .  pp.3-5. 
 
50 Samecki (2009a) op. cit . p.5 
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together with ideas for improving the delivery to ensure a smoother, simpler and more 
proportionate approach.51
The concept of functional regions, and the other scales for territorial cohesion, have been 
explored further by DG Regio. Building on the debates about territorial potential under the 
Swedish EU presidency, Director-General Dirk Ahner recently emphasised two important 
points: first, functional or other territories for cooperation need to be identified by the 
regions themselves rather than top down; and second, such territories may be at different 
spatial scales  some may be macro-regions, others urban (or inter-urban), or they may be 
micro-regions.52  Different problems may require different scales of intervention. It is 
suggested that EU-funded programme strategies should incorporate a greater territorial or 
place-based dimension, with more use of geographically specific territories (local, regional, 
pluri-regional), as well as other linkages and networks, for different policy actions.53 For 
macro-regions, DG Regio have suggested strengthening the strategic effect by funding a 
limited number of key or flagship projects linked to the implementation of a macro-
regional strategy and fostering coherence with other funding programmes.54
The key question for this report is how these ideas and proposals are assessed by IQ-Net 
managing authorities on the basis of practical experience. A secondary question is whether 
there are examples of functional regions, either for planning purposes or as a basis for 
intervention, that could provide lessons for the Cohesion policy debate. 
The overall message from the IQ-Net research is that a greater territorial dimension within 
Structural Funds to programmes would have considerable merit (see also Section 2), and 
there is support for a more integrated approach. There is also a cautious welcome for 
strengthening territorial cooperation  especially among those countries with extensive land 
borders. However, the managing authorities have some important reservations.  
The main concern is that the current investment in territorial cooperation is not working 
effectively. This is mainly because the concrete benefits of territorial cooperation are not 
always clear. Results are perceived as being often in the form of studies and reports, and 
there is a perceived need to ensure a stronger focus on practical tasks and achievable 
goals. Clearly, territorial cooperation programmes do support tangible investment (e.g. in 
infrastructure) and have other major physical outputs, but the effectiveness of 
interventions has proved to be very difficult to capture and quantify. 55Currently, territorial 
                                                 
51 DG Regio (2010b) European Territ orial  Cooperat ion, Paper for High-Level Group Meeting No.4, 
Brussels, 25-26 March 2010. 
 
52 Ahner, D. (2010) Int roduct ion t o t he Seminar ‘ Territ orial  cohesion: what  scales of  pol icy 
int ervent ion’ , Follow up of Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion 2nd TCUM session 
Seminar  Brussels, 12 March 2010. 
 
53 Peyrony, J. (2010) Territ orial  cohesion: what  scales for pol icy int ervent ion?, and Dijkstra, L. (2010) 
Funct ional regions: which regions and what  funct ions? Presentations to the Seminar Territorial 
cohesion: what scales of policy intervention, Follow up of Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion 2nd 
TCUM session Seminar  Brussels, 12 March 2010. 
 
54 DG Regio (2010) op. cit .  
55 Panteice et  al (2010) Ex post  evaluat ion of  INTERREG 2000-2006, Second Interim Report to the 
European Commission (DG Regio), Panteice and Partners, Zoetermeer. 
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cooperation is considered to be insufficiently focused on  strategic projects with strong 
added value. Thus, while the value of cooperation may be strong in theory, it is frequently 
regarded as weak in practice; one regional-level managing authority claimed that there is 
a clear rationale for territorial cooperation but it is unnecessarily complicated, restrictive 
and confusing and achieves little or no impact in the real world. 
It is the complexity and restrictiveness that form the basis for other criticisms. For some 
managing authorities, the pre-allocation of funding to countries rather than (the best) 
projects undermines the effectiveness of the objective. Others are critical of the number of 
different cooperation spaces, advocating a smaller number of territorial cooperation 
programmes, with a more focused set of objectives and fewer projects. Bureaucracy is 
another issue. One national managing authority commented that the bureaucratic burden 
for project owners (especially lead partners) as well as managing authorities and member 
states (first and second level controllers) has become absolutely unbearable - due to the 
fact that everyone is afraid of making mistakes and tries to reduce risk by inventing new 
rules and safety mechanisms, which leads to additional requirements for others. Problems 
also arise because participating organisations represent different levels, with varying 
resources, power and responsibilities. The EGTC instrument, which is not in widespread use 
among IQ-Net authorities, is not regarded as a solution to overcoming the administrative 
and regulatory differences between countries and regions 
The evidence from the research indicates that linking Convergence/Competitiveness 
programmes with territorial cooperation programmes is proving to be difficult. Considerable 
administrative effort is sometimes required and the results are patchy; one managing 
authority noted that the two universes are separate and never involve the same people, 
which means that there is no cooperation on individual projects. In some cases, a 
territorial cooperation programme is seen as a second-order source of funding for projects 
not supported under the regional OP. Some authorities were critical that DG Regio had left 
Member States to lead on this, by comparison with DG Employment which is said to have 
been more pro-active and provided more guidance to managing authorities. 
Looking forward, the above criticisms mean that there is considerable scepticism about the 
practicality of expanding territorial cooperation as a separate objective unless the above 
problems can be addressed. In fact, the majority view would favour a more coherent and 
integrated approach to spending under regional programmes and cross-border/transnational 
programmes. Several authorities saw value in having: a single strategic reference 
framework covering all interventions; the integration of territorial cooperation actions 
within regional programmes; and the management of all regional and cooperation support 
through common administrative structures. 
This thinking also informed many IQ-Net reactions to the question of macro-regions. While 
the logic of macro-regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region is clear, the relevance of 
the concept in most other parts of the EU is regarded as being less evident. Many current 
transnational spaces are described as artificial, imposed, political projects that 
encourage rent-seeking behaviour and have unproven benefits. Three critical issues for 
many respondents are that: 
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(a) macro-regions need to be built up from the bottom  with regions demonstrating 
that there is a common interest and commitment through projects with concrete 
outcomes, involving the development of trust and real added value; and 
(b) they need to be based on a wider agenda and longer term experience of inter-
governmental cooperation (that transcends Cohesion policy and encompasses 
domestic policies) in the relevant area, as is the case for the Baltic Sea Region and 
some other spaces (e.g. Alpe-Adria); and 
(c) the experience of the Baltic Sea macro-region should be evaluated before the 
concept is applied more widely, and before resources are diverted from other areas 
of Cohesion policy. 
Finally, there is a willingness to consider how smaller scale functional regions might be 
promoted through Cohesion policy. France uses multi-region programmes for both domestic 
policies and Cohesion policy where this is warranted by geographical challenges or common 
objectives (see Box 5). At sub-regional scale, the new Polish Strategy for Regional 
Development makes provision for areas of strategic intervention that include metropolitan 
agglomerations, rural development areas. The concept of city regions - enlarged 
territories from which core urban areas draw people for work and services - has been 
promoted in the United Kingdom (England), and eight such city regions are part of the 
Northern Way, a multi-region collaboration initiative across three north English regions.  
These are all examples of Member State practice, based on initiatives that have developed 
to meet the requirements and policy objectives of national governments. While there is a 
recognition that Cohesion policy could help to build such functional territories, some IQ-Net 
authorities would be concerned if such spaces were to be determined top down, and had 
implications for the current approach to determining eligibility for Cohesion policy 
resources. On the eligibility question, there is a clear divide between countries: between 
those that support a specific territorial focus on areas with physical and geographical 
features/handicaps, and urban/rural areas, as well as employing specific indicators 
(additional to GDP) at different spatial scales; and those that oppose this, arguing for the 
need to maintain comprehensive approach to territories, rather than separating out urban 
and rural area issues 
Box 5: Multi-regional programmes for coherent and effective territorial development 
 
The French contribution to the consultation on territorial cohesion states that it is indispensable to 
take account of multi-regional territories which are in a position to generate added value. This leads 
to gains in implementation coherence and effectiveness since administrative borders are not always in 
line with territorial characteristics. The implementation of joint interventions also promotes the 
exchange of experiences, good practice, and the development of networks. 
France has adopted four multiregional programmes for functional areas under domestic frameworks 
and Cohesion policy justified by geographic specificities and joint challenges and objectives (e.g. 
water quality, flood prevention, accessibility and depopulation): two mountain ranges (Massif Central 
and the Alps), and two river basins (Rhône and Loire). The added-value of the programmes lies in the 
identification of priorities which are specific to a particular geographical territory exceeding the 
regional administrative framework and based on a comprehensive strategy for the territory. 
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6. SIMPLIFICATION 
There is a broad measure of agreement on the need to simplify the implementation of 
Cohesion policy, especially in the areas of financial management, audit and control.56 
Increased application of the proportionality principle (differentiated requirements) is often 
mentioned as an option. The ex-post evaluation of EU27 management and implementation 
systems suggested that this could be applied at the Member States level, based for example 
on standards of public administration.57  The Barca Report and the Samecki Paper have 
proposed several other areas where differentiated requirements could be potentially 
applied, including certain instruments, types of beneficiary or smaller grants, and to the 
automatic decommitment rule. Other proposals to simplify financial management include: 
moving to a two-level management and control system with a single payment and control 
authority and audit authority; a higher tolerable error rate; basing reimbursements on the 
declaration of payments by Member States rather than on expenditure by beneficiaries; and 
the harmonization of eligibility rules for all EU funding instruments.  
While there is a broad consensus on the need to simplify the implementation of Cohesion 
policy, some programme administrators have expressed wariness about new simplification 
initiatives. It is argued that previous experiences have often resulted in requirements being 
substituted by reporting and thus achieving little in administrative workload terms. A 
recent example is the simplification of rules on overheads that has led to demands for 
additional financial reporting. 
Turning to the specific proposals mentioned, differentiated requirements by Member State 
have received mixed feedback from managing authorities. Some strongly agree with the 
proposal and argue that the Commission should place greater reliance on the use of 
domestic audit and control systems, at least in those countries with good systems. It is 
argued that the designation of a specific Audit Authority for Cohesion policy can be 
redundant because it simply duplicates the work of national audit authorities. Moreover, if 
a Member State has weak domestic audit authorities, the weaknesses may also apply to the 
auditing of Cohesion policy; it could be preferable for the European Court of Auditors 
(rather than the Commission) to report on the work of the domestic audit authorities in 
relation to EU expenditure in order to drive up standards. Lastly, it was noted that the 
differentiation of rules by Member State has a precedent, as the contracts of confidence 
initiative was applied at national level in some cases.  
On the other hand, other programme authorities argue that the general rules should apply 
in a uniform manner across all countries. If some public bodies, programmes or Member 
                                                 
56 Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2009) Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: Reviewing the 
Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+, European Pol icy Research Papers, No 67, European Policies 
Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; Davies, S. Gross, F. and Polverari, L. (2008) The 
Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU Cohesion Policy, IQ-Net  Themat ic Paper 23(2), 
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
 
57 Bachtler J (2009) Can Dif ferent iat ed Requirement s for Dif ferent  Member St at es be Defended? 
Paper prepared for hearing on the first findings of the ex post evaluation of objectives 1 and 2, 23 
June 2009, European Commission, Brussels;  
Bachtler et  al  (2009) op.cit .
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States do not follow the rules then the Commission should be more demanding, but this 
does not imply or require differentiated regulatory requirements. Concerns were also raised 
about the adoption of a two-tier policy model, seen as being contrary to the underlying 
principles of the EU. In any case, it is considered to be very difficult to agree on such 
proposals at EU level because it would imply making controversial judgments about the 
quality of governance arrangements in different Member States.  
An alternative proposal is to further develop the single audit principle introduced in the 
2007-13 period and which has more general applicability. The underlying aim of the 
principle is for Commission assurance to be based on national and programme systems 
assessment and checking while relying on the audit and control work of the Member States 
at project level. However, there are doubts about whether the principle is operating as 
planned or how it will work over the course of the current period. For instance, one 
programme authority observed that they will have to wait and see if the Commission will 
trust their national audit authority. Moreover, the Commissions auditors still visit and 
check the work of Audit Authorities and Managing Authorities at the project level, even in 
cases where the compliance assessment exercise was approved speedily without any 
significant difficulties.  
The recently agreed provisions for the use of simplified costs - to break the link with real 
costs - was regarded by some managing authorities as being an important breakthrough in 
the simplification of financial management, audit and control.58 Again, however, it will be 
necessary to see how this works in practice as very few managing authorities have yet to 
implement this option. More generally, several managing authorities mentioned the need 
for an inter-institutional agreement on a new tolerable risk of error that is sensitive to the 
specificities of Cohesion policy.  
Lighter administrative requirements for smaller projects are generally supported, especially 
as such projects tend to be led by project promoters with limited resources. However, 
major projects are also regarded as facing significant administrative burdens. The 
requirement for Commission approval of major project is not necessarily a problem, but the 
ex-ante assessment requirements are seen as being onerous and especially difficult for 
projects that are implemented in phases. 
The introduction of some form of proportionality for different types of intervention is 
generally welcomed by the managing authorities interviewed. A regularly made criticism is 
that innovative projects are often discouraged from applying for funding due to perceptions 
about excessive administrative burden, particularly compared to domestic funding streams. 
Managing authorities often argue that innovative projects should not face the same 
requirements as, for instance, large-scale infrastructure investments (e.g. a road or 
railway) where beneficiaries or implementing bodies tend to have the resources or 
capacities in place to cope with the administrative obligations.  
                                                 
58 European Commission (2010) Indirect  cost s declared on a f lat  rat e basis, f lat  rat e cost s calculat ed 
by appl icat ion of  st andard scales of  unit  cost s and lump sums,  Working document prepared by the 
Coordination Committee of the Funds (COCOF), COCOF 09/0025/04-EN, Brussels. 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 26(2)  European Policies Research Centre 36
The Reform of Cohesion Policy After 2013: More Concentration, Greater Performance and Better 
Governance? 
Efforts to lessen the administrative burden for financial engineering instruments are also 
viewed positively by some programme authorities. A more proportionate approach to 
JESSICA would be welcomed as would efforts to facilitate other innovative solutions in 
relation to the recycling of funds and sustainability of investments. By contrast, a number 
of managing authorities argue that it is not necessary for the EU to try to encourage more 
active take-up of specific instruments (such as venture capital), especially where there is a 
lack of demand or where the programmes are relatively small scale and such initiatives can 
be more easily promoted through domestic channels. Similarly, some programme 
authorities do not see a need for more proportionality in projects involving private sector 
actors and argue that they should meet the same regulatory standards as public 
beneficiaries.  
Perhaps more urgent than proportionality is the need for clarification of the rules governing 
financial engineering support. Outstanding questions concern the funding of the domestic 
co-financing contribution and on administrative costs. Similarly, clarification is needed on 
the rules relating to project checks and how far into the future these requirements apply. 
Looking to the future, it is argued that these rules should be defined before the 
programmes for 2014+ are approved or, better still, they should be set out in a specific 
regulation before the next period commences. 
The proposal to apply the decommitment rule at the national level has some support. The 
perceived benefits are additional simplicity and flexibility while maintaining discipline, 
although concerns were raised about the potential de-responsibilising effects on 
programmes especially in Member States with a high number of programmes.  The 
extension of n+2 to n+3 to all Member States also has some support, particularly if there is 
a move towards an enhanced performance orientation. Others see no need for greater 
proportionality in relation to n+2 and welcome the disciplinary pressure that it imposes on 
beneficiaries. It was also noted that applying the rule at national level would invite 
comparison across Member States and could increase the politicisation of the instrument.  
The suggestion that EU reimbursement could be based on a declaration of payments by 
Member States rather than on expenditure has received mixed reactions. A key benefit 
would be that payments from the Commission would not be held up by problems with just 
one specific beneficiary as is the case at the moment. On the other hand, some programme 
authorities have not reported any particular cash flow problems in relation to Commission 
payments or argue that programme authorities would still need reasonable assurance that 
final beneficiaries have genuinely made the relevant investments and have correctly spent 
the funding. In light of this, there is some uncertainty as to whether the proposal would be 
any different from current obligations. There could even be some drawbacks. The greater 
responsibility for managing authorities may in fact imply a greater administrative workload. 
For instance, it was argued that two payments declarations would be needed, first without 
verified expenditure and then with verified expenditure by beneficiaries for certification. 
In addition, the legal implications of the proposals remain unclear. 
Lastly, the harmonisation of eligibility rules across EU funding instruments has widespread 
support. Improved coordination between Commission DGs and clarification of the rules for 
beneficiaries are regarded as being important goals, even though most eligibility rules are 
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defined at the national level in this period and the proposal is less relevant for those 
managing authorities that are not involved in the management of other EU instruments. 
Apart from leading to conflicting interpretations of different EU rules, the current approach 
is seen to generate competition with other EU funds which are perceived to be easier to 
administer and to block the ability to cross-finance across Structural Funds. A drawback is 
that harmonisation may be difficult to achieving in practice at EU or the domestic level, 
particularly given the different thematic orientation of different instruments and the need 
for enhanced coordination between different Commission DGs when interpreting the rules. 
Indeed, harmonisation of eligibility rules may only be feasible through a single regulation 
for all instruments. Concern was also expressed about the implications of harmonization for 
the Cohesion Fund as a stand-alone funding instrument.  
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7. GOVERNANCE  
The multi-level governance of Cohesion policy and its implementation through shared 
management are generally regarded as important assets of the policy.59 The Barca Report 
argued that a place-based approach to fulfilling the Treatys objectives on cohesion 
requires the responsibility for policy design and implementation to be allocated among 
different levels of government supported by both contractual relations and trust. Higher 
levels of government set the rules and general objectives for using the funding provided, 
leaving it to lower levels of government to implement these principles according to the 
context as they see fit. The importance of this approach was reinforced by Member State 
ministers in 2009 who referred to shared management and multi-level governance as being 
preconditions of the success of the policy on the ground.60
Similar views have been expressed in the debate on Europe 2020, which has been criticised 
by regional policymakers for insufficient appreciation of the role of sub-national actors. As 
noted in the HLG paper61 many of the policy solutions of the Europe 2020 strategy will 
need to be implemented at sub-national level; in which regional and local actors have a 
vital role to play. The HLG paper points out that the delivery of the Lisbon strategy was 
weakened by the lack of an efficient multilevel governance system. 
Equally, it is recognised that the governance of the policy needs reform. In part, this 
involves issues like policy concentration (discussed in Section 1 above), strategic coherence 
(Section 4), a stronger focus on results (Section 3) and simplified administration (Section 6). 
Two further important questions, which have been addressed in the IQ-Net research, are: 
x whether the Commission should have a more strategic role than at present and 
whether and how its activities should become more focused; and 
x whether regulatory or operational changes are required to improve partnership, 
especially the involvement of regions and local authorities. 
7.1 Role of the Commission 
The Barca Report argued that the Commission needs to play a more ambitious and 
demanding role than today. Specifically, it proposed that the resources and organisation of 
the Commission (and particularly DG Regio) should be strengthened so that it could play a 
more effective role: as a contract partner in engaging with Member States on strategic 
decisions; and as a think tank conversant with advanced economic and social thinking, 
especially methods at the frontier of international debate and experience. Better internal 
coordination and cooperation among DGs responsible for structural policies was advocated.  
                                                 
59 Hübner (2009) op. cit .  Samecki P (2009a) op. cit . Communiqué of Ministers for Regional Policy, 
Mariánské Lázne, Czech Republic, 23 April 2009, Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU. 
60 Communiqué of Ministers for Regional Policy, op. cit .  
 
61 DG Regio (2010a) op. cit .  The view is shared by the Committee of the Regions, among others. 
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Possible changes to the role of the Commission also emerged from the ex post evaluation of 
Cohesion policy in 2006, which recommended that the Commission should play a more 
active role in developing institutional capacity, improving leadership, promoting 
organisational learning and raising standards of public administration.62  
Some of this analysis is shared by IQ-Net managing authorities. The main criticism of 
current governance arrangements is that the Commission is overly involved in 
implementation, especially financial management, control and audit. The past decade has 
seen growing tension over the costs and benefits of the Structural Funds approach to 
financial management, control and audit, and over the appropriate roles of EU and Member 
State authorities in controlling and auditing EU co-financed expenditure.63 Of particular 
concern are the increased administrative obligations, a focus on financial absorption at the 
expense of project quality, and a greater  risk aversion in the management of EU funding 
termed  by some as a cover your back culture where managing and implementing bodies 
are permanently concerned about being overruled by Commission officials. 
Going beyond financial control, a wider issue is the perception that the Commission is not 
always a reliable partner, an assertion made with reference to the way in which 
ambiguous rules are interpreted late or applied retrospectively, creating significant 
problems for Member States whose systems have already been set up.  
This is often linked to the perceived remoteness of the Commission services from the 
realities of programme implementation, with a loss of trust between geographical units and 
programme managers. Examples cited by IQ-Net managing authorities include: the turnover 
of geographical unit staff in the Commission services, and loss of institutional memory; desk 
officers who have limited awareness of national and regional development challenges, 
policies and institutions, or who are poorly briefed (for example on COCOF guidance); the 
lack of active engagement of desk officers in monitoring committees; and the formality of 
large-scale annual meetings with the Commission (and attendant lack of opportunity for 
discussion). Those with longer term memories bemoan the reduction or disappearance of 
the informal working relationships between desk officers and programme staff which were 
more common in the 1990s. 
Against this background, there is almost universal agreement among IQ-Net Managing 
Authorities that the Commission should adopt a more strategic role, which means focusing 
on the overall objectives of the policy, supporting learning processes and helping to raise 
the achievements of the policy. 
Fundamental for more effective governance is resolving t he issue of  f inancial  management , 
cont rol  and audit  (see Section 6), so that the Commission role is rebalanced away from 
controlling expenditure and ensuring compliance with the rules to supporting the 
strategic management of programmes. Key steps highlighted by IQ-Net managing authorities 
                                                 
62 Bachtler, J., Polverari, L., Orae, H., Clement, K. and Tödtling-Schönhofer, H. (2009) op. cit .  
63 See also: Davies S, Gross F and Polverari (2008) The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU 
Cohesion policy: Contrasting Views on Challenges, Idiosyncrasies and the Way Ahead, IQ-Net  Themat ic 
Paper, 23(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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are the need to re-focus efforts on fraud rather than on formal irregularities, and to ensure 
the proportionality of control requirements at programme and project levels.64 More 
generally, there is a perceived need to provide timely, clear and definitive rules and 
guidance; to ensure greater clarity and better communication; and to improve coordination 
on this issue within the Commission.  
Three other important recommendations by IQ-Net managing authorities are: 
x the development  of  capacit y wit hin t he Commission services, so that they become 
a valued source of expertise on strategic policy issues, with thematic and 
institutional knowledge; 
x an enhanced role for the Commission in facil i t at ing t he t ransfer of  good pract ice 
from one country/region to another through bilateral Commission-Member State 
mechanisms, helping not just to spread the diffusion of new ideas but also  assisting 
their application in specific ways which reflect the needs and challenges of 
individual countries and regions; and 
x a new relat ionship between Commission geographical unit s and programme 
managers, whereby Commission desk officers develop a better understanding of 
how Structural Funds regulations and guidelines are translated in practice, and the 
impact they have on the ground. This potentially means that desk officers serve as 
a two-way conduit, on the one hand providing a channel for ensuring that EU 
objectives are met, and on the other hand actively feeding back the views and 
interests of the regions into the Commission services. 
7.2 Partnership 
The second governance-related question is whether regulatory or operational changes are 
required to improve partnership, especially the involvement of regions and local 
authorities. Under the Barca Reports interpretation of place-based policymaking, the 
mobilisation of regions and local authorities is required to ensure that everyone is given the 
opportunity and the information to participate in resource allocation decisions (and also to 
voice their dissent).65 Yet, the evidence is that, while there has been a significant increase 
in the involvement of sub-national actors over the past two decades, the practice of 
partnership varies greatly between countries.66 The role of regions is not always 
guaranteed, and the involvement of local authorities, economic and social partners and 
non-governmental organisations is frequently minimal.67
                                                 
64
 Ibid. 
 
65 Barca (2009) op. cit . Chapter 1. 
 
66 Bachtler et  al  (2009) op. cit . 
67 Polverari L and Michie R (2009) New Partnership Dynamics in a Changing Cohesion Policy Context, 
IQ-Net  Themat ic Paper, 25(2), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow. 
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The current proposals from the Commission have little to say about partnership. The 
reflections paper by former Commissioner Hübner suggested that by creating new types of 
partnerships multi-level governance can foster cooperation that cuts across administrative 
boundaries to target policy in functional economic areas.68 The more recent paper by 
former Commissioner Samecki noted only that greater use of public-private partnership 
schemes has the potential to leverage public resources and increase efficiency and cost-
effectiveness.69
This caution is replicated among IQ-Net managing authorities, who generally do not see a 
need for regulatory change.70 There is a consensus that the partnership obligation is 
valuable, particularly in securing the involvement of regional and local authorities in the 
governance of the policy, but there is also a general belief that the interpretation of 
partnership has to be adapted to national institutional arrangements and practices. For 
example, several IQ-Net authorities consider themselves to be exemplars of best practice 
in involving a wide range of partners in all stages of programme management, but this is 
taking place in a conducive national/regional context, where such approaches are also 
characteristic of non-EU policymaking. 
Most managing authorities appear to be satisfied with their interpretation of partnership, 
especially the (limited) extent to which non-state actors are involved. Increasing their 
involvement would demand clarity on what such partners could and should contribute in 
terms of programme effectiveness, management efficiency or accountability.71 The main 
challenge for Cohesion policy, in the view of IQ-Net managing authorities, is how to build 
capacity among non-state actors  in terms of resources, skills, technical knowledge  to 
enable them to become more credible and active partners in programme management and 
implementation. 
 
                                                 
68 Hübner (2009) op. cit .  p.6. 
 
69 Samecki (2009a) op. cit . p.13. 
 
70 See also Polverari and Michie (2009) op .cit .  
 
71 Polverari and Michie (2009) op. cit . p.52. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this IQ-Net paper has been to assess how recent proposals for reforming EU 
Cohesion policy are viewed by managing authorities and implementing bodies. It has 
examined whether the proposed changes are regarded as beneficial in principle, the 
implications of operationalising them, where they might encounter problems, and what 
alternatives could be considered. This final section draws together the main conclusions to 
emerge from the research. 
8.1 Reflections on the reform debate 
The starting points for the debate are the strategic objectives for a future Cohesion policy. 
There is broad agreement among IQ-Net managing authorities with the principles of Europe 
2020 and for Cohesion policy to be aligned with the strategy. However, they are critical of 
the lack of reference to cohesion issues in Europe 2020 and are greatly concerned at the 
consequences of an overly thematic approach (as opposed to a place-based approach) for 
programming Structural and Cohesion Funds. A key challenge for Cohesion policy interests  
within and outside the Commission  is not just to advocate the value of Cohesion policy as 
a useful multi-level government instrument for delivering Europe 2020, but to demonstrate 
where and how a territorial dimension is an important (or even critical) success factor for 
achieving Europe 2020 goals. 
There is support for the proposed priorities of innovation and competitiveness, social 
inclusion and green growth, but an insistence on sufficient flexibility for strategies to be 
adapted to national and regional needs and institutional arrangements. Most popular is a 
menu approach whereby common priorities would be adopted at EU level but interpreted 
by Member States and regions to suit local circumstances. 
A further strategic question is how coherence between policy areas and funding 
instruments can be improved. Managing authorities are supportive of proposals of a 
common strategic framework for cohesion at EU level but only if it simplifies the 
hierarchy of objectives rather than adding another layer. However, there is widespread 
dubiety as to whether such an umbrella strategy is achievable. More realistic would be a 
single framework for structural policies (regional development, employment, rural 
development, fisheries) involving a single set of Community guidelines, harmonisation of 
rules and procedures, joint programming of operations (where feasible), a single audit 
authority and audit regime, and inter-DG working groups. The interface between Structural 
Funds and Rural Development is a particular priority in this regard. Importantly, it needs to 
be recognised that changes to institutional arrangements are not the only answer; there are 
many lessons from current practice in the Member States that could improve operational 
coordination. 
The importance of territoriality is reinforced in the discussion about territorial cooperation 
and territorial cohesion. Managing authorities see considerable merit in a more integrated 
policy approach for addressing the distinctive needs and challenges of particular territories, 
and there is certainly scope for encouraging more a place-based approach to programming 
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(especially analysis) and the allocation of resources. Intervention at different spatial scales 
could also be considered, but there is a strong insistence on Member States and regions 
determining the appropriate spatial scale of intervention.  
Managing authorities are also supportive of territorial cooperation, but its value is seen as 
being greater in theory than in practical results on the ground. The perceived complexity 
and bureaucracy of territorial cooperation gives rise to vehement criticism from some 
authorities, and there is considerable scepticism about the practicality for expanding this 
objective unless the implementation problems can be addressed. Progress in 
Convergence/Competitiveness programmes with territorial cooperation programmes is 
often proving to be difficult, and there is a need to rethink how best coherence could be 
achieved, whether by having a single strategic framework, the integration of territorial 
cooperation actions within regional programmes, or managing both types of programmes 
with the same administrative structures. 
A broader implementation question is how the performance and results of Cohesion policy 
can be improved. While accepting the arguments for a more results-oriented policy, 
managing authorities are largely sceptical about the use of EU-determined conditionalities 
and incentives, due to methodological factors (difficulties of setting relevant targets, 
inadequate data, problems with comparative assessment, external influences), the 
unpredictable and possibly perverse consequences, and the likelihood of political 
objections. Instead, authorities see more scope in exploring how individual 
countries/regions could be incentivised to improve performance in programme-specific 
ways (especially at project level), and to use more qualitative methods for assessing 
performance through peer review, benchmarking, exchanges of best practice and 
evaluation. 
A major obstacle is that monitoring continues to be problematic for many managing 
authorities, with unrealistic targets, variable data quality, data processing issues and 
limited exploitation of results. There is an acceptance that core indicators and target-
setting may need to be obligatory (but with guidance available at the programming stage), 
but this is unlikely to be of sufficient quality to allow aggregation to EU level. In this 
situation, the question is whether it would make more sense to ensure that programmes 
have a good-quality monitoring system that meets individual needs (but is not necessarily 
structured to allow comparability) and to entrust the analysis of results and impacts to 
evaluation.   
It is in the area of evaluation that investment appears to have been more productive, with 
the progressive development of an evaluation culture and more commissioning and usage 
of evaluations. Here again, though, the main message from the research is that evaluation 
requirements should not be imposed uniformly, but that the approach should be needs-
based and flexible, focusing on areas where there is scope for improvement in individual 
countries and regions. 
Strategic reporting is still new and suffers from some of the deficiencies of monitoring and 
evaluation, notably the compliance-oriented response from several Member States which 
has undermined the utility of the exercise. The main lessons from the recent exercise is the 
IQ-Net Thematic Paper 26(2)  European Policies Research Centre 44
The Reform of Cohesion Policy After 2013: More Concentration, Greater Performance and Better 
Governance? 
need for reporting to be more focused, concentrating on strategic issues and assessing the 
added value of policies  issues that require action on the part of Member States. There is 
also an onus on the Commission services to demonstrate how the reports can be used 
effectively as a basis for peer review, and on the Council to demonstrate that there really 
is political interest in a high-level debate. 
The simplification of Cohesion policy management and implementation has been a goal of 
policy debate and reform for more than a decade but has proved to be elusive. There is 
universal agreement on the need to simplify implementation rules and procedures but no 
clear consensus on how it should be achieved. Differentiation of requirements by Member 
State has some support among managing authorities, but others are opposed to moving 
away from uniformly applied rules.  There are also differences over whether decommitment 
should apply at the national level, and over the suggestion that EU reimbursement could be 
based on a declaration of payments by Member States, rather than on expenditure. 
There is broader agreement on extending the use of system assurance (underlying the 
current single audit model) whereby the focus of Commission assessment is on national or 
programme systems, while relying on Member States to ensure that the systems are applied 
properly in practice. The introduction of some form of proportionality of administrative 
requirements for different types of intervention  on the basis of scale of resources, risk 
involved etc  is generally favoured by managing authorities. The need for clear rules is also 
stressed, a major current concern with respect to financial engineering support for many 
authorities. Lastly, there is widespread support for the harmonisation of eligibility rules 
across EU funding instruments. 
The final issue discussed in this report is the governance of Cohesion policy, notably the 
role of the Commission and the regulatory and operational approach to partnership. The 
main criticisms of the Commission by managing authorities are, unsurprisingly, related to its 
focus on controlling expenditure, alleged ambiguity in the interpretation of rules and the 
perceived remoteness of the Commission services from the realities of programme 
implementation. Fundamental for more effective governance is resolving the administrative 
burden of financial management, control and audit. In addition, managing authorities would 
welcome the development of capacity within the Commission services on strategic policy 
issues, an enhanced Commission role in facilitating the transfer of good practice and its 
application in individual countries/regions, and a better relationship between Commission 
geographical units and programme managers.  
Lastly, on the issue of partnership, managing authorities are generally content with the 
current arrangements and generally do not see the need for regulatory change. The main 
challenge is one for Member States in building the capacity among non-state actors to 
become more credible and active partners in programme management and implementation.  
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Improving the Quality of Structural Funds 
 Programme Management 
through Exchange of Experience 
IQ-Net is a network of Convergence and Regional Competitiveness programmes actively 
exchanging experience on practical programming issues. It involves a programme of 
research and debate on topical themes relating to Structural Funds programme design, 
management and delivery, culminating in twice-yearly meetings of members. IQ-Net was 
established in 1996 and has successfully completed three periods of operation: 1996-99, 
1999-2002 and 2002-07. The fourth phase was launched on 1 July 2007 (Phase IV, 2007-10). 
IQ-Net Meetings  
27 partners meetings and a special 10th 
anniversary conference have been held in twelve 
European countries during 14 years of operation 
of the Network. Meetings are held at 
approximately six-month intervals and are open 
to IQ-Net partners and to observers interested in 
joining the Network. The meetings are designed 
to facilitate direct exchange of experience on 
selected issues, through the presentation of 
briefing papers, plenary discussions, workshop 
sessions and study visits in the hosting regions. 
 
 
IQ-Net Website 
The IQ-Net Website is the Networks main vehicle of communication for partners and the 
public (www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet). The launch of Phase IV has been accompanied by an 
extensive redesign of the site which comprises two sections: 
 
 
Part ner Int ranet  Pages available exclusively to 
IQ-Net members.  
 
Publ ic Pages which provide information on the 
Networks activities and meetings, allow the 
download of IQ-Net Reports and Bulletins, and 
provide a news section on issues relevant to the 
Network. 
 
The Partners section of the website provides exclusive services to members of the 
Network, including access to all materials prepared for the IQ-Net meetings, a list of EU27 
links (programmes, institutions, economics and statistics etc.), partners contact details, a 
partners blog and other items of interest. 
IQ-Net Reports 
The IQ-Net Reports form the basis for the discussions at each IQ-Net meeting. They present 
applied and practical information in a style accessible to policy-makers, programme 
executives and administrators. The reports can be downloaded, at no charge, from the IQ-
Net website. To date, around 26 thematic papers have been produced on both functional 
issues (e.g. management arrangements, partnership, information and communication, 
monitoring systems) and thematic issues (e.g. innovation, enterprise development, 
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tourism). A similar number of papers have also been produced to review developments in 
the implementation of the Networks partner programmes. 
 
IQ-Net Thematic Papers 
x Horizontal Partnership Dynamics in the 2007-2013 period 
x Pandoras Box and the Delphic Oracle: EU Cohesion Policy and State Aid Compliance 
x The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU Cohesion Policy 
x From Environmental Sustainability to Sustainable Development? Making Concepts 
Tangible in Structural Funds Programmes 
x Making sense of European Cohesion Policy: 2007-13 on-going evaluation and monitoring 
x Turning ideas into action: the implementation of 2007-13 programmes 
x The New Generation of Operational Programmes, 2007-2013 
x National Strategic Reference Frameworks and OPs, 2007-2013 
x Preparations for the Programme Period 2007-13 
x Territorial Cohesion and Structural Funds 
x Cohesion Policy Funding for Innovation and the Knowledge Economy 
x The Added Value of Structural Funds 
x Information, Publicity and Communication 
x Mid-term Evaluation of the 2000-06 Programmes 
x Mainstreaming Horizontal Themes into Structural Fund Programming 
x The Structural Funds: Facilitating the Information Society 
x Information into Intelligence: Monitoring for Effective Structural Fund Programming 
x At the Starting Block: Review of the New Programmes 
x Tourism and Structural Funds 
x Preparations for the New Programmes 
x The New Regulations and Programming 
x Strategic Approaches to Regional Innovation 
x Effective Responses to Job Creation 
x The Evolution of Programmes and Future Prospects 
x Equal Opportunities in Structural Fund Programmes 
x The Contribution of Meso-Partnerships to Structural Fund Implementation 
x Regional Environmental Integration: Changing Perceptions and Practice  
x Structural Fund Synergies: ERDF and ESF 
x The Interim Evaluation of Programmes 
x Monitoring and Evaluation: Principles and Practice 
x Generating Good Projects 
x RTD and Innovation in Programmes 
x Managing the Structural Funds  Institutionalising Good Practice 
x Synthesis of Strategies 1994-96 
IQ-Net Bulletin  
The IQ-Net Bulletin promotes the dissemination of the Networks activities 
and results. Fourteen issues have been published to date, over the period 
from 1996 to 2009. Bulletins are published using a standard format, with 
each providing summaries of the research undertaken and reports on the 
discussions which take place at IQ-Net meetings. The Bulletins can be 
downloaded from the IQ-Net website (public pages). A printed version is 
also sent out to the IQ-Net mailing list.  
 
Admission to the IQ-Net Network is open to national and regional Structural Funds Managing 
Authorities and programme secretariats. For further information or to express an interest, 
contact Professor John Bachtler (john.bachtler@strath.ac.uk) or Laura Polverari 
(laura.polverari@strath.ac.uk. 
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